Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality And Biotechnology In Patent Law by Bagley, Margo A.
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 45 | Issue 2 Article 3
Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality And
Biotechnology In Patent Law
Margo A. Bagley
mbagley@law.emory.edu
Copyright c 2003 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality And Biotechnology In Patent Law, 45 Wm.
& Mary L. Rev. 469 (2003), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol45/iss2/3
William and Mary
Law Review
VOLUME 45 No. 2,2003
PATENT FIRST, ASK QUESTIONS LATER: MORALITY AND
BIOTECHNOLOGY IN PATENT LAW
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This Article explores the U.S. "patent first, ask questions later"
approach to determining what subject matter should receive patent
protection. Under this approach, the US. Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO or the Agency) issues patents on "anything under the
sun made by man," and to the extent a patent's subject matter is
sufficiently controversial, Congress acts retrospectively in assessing
whether patents should issue on such inventions. This practice has
important ramifications for morally controversial biotechnology
patents specifically, and for American society generally.
For many years ajudicially created "moral utility" doctrine served
as a type of gatekeeper of patent subject matter eligibility. The
doctrine allowed both the USPTO and courts to deny patents on
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morally controversial subject matter under the fiction that such in-
ventions were not "useful."
The gate, however, is currently untended. A combination of the
demise of the moral utility doctrine, along with expansive judicial
interpretations of the scope of patent-eligible subject matter, has
resulted in virtually no basis on which the USPTO or courts can
deny patent protection to morally controversial, but otherwise pat-
entable, subject matter. This is so despite position statements by the
Agency to the contrary.
Biotechnology is an area in which many morally controversial
inventions are generated. Congress has been in react-mode following
the issuance of a stream of morally controversial biotech patents,
including patents on transgenic animals, surgical methods, and
methods of cloning humans. With no statutory limits on patent
eligibility, and with myriad concerns complicating congressional
action following a patent's issuance, it is not Congress, the represen-
tative of the people, determining patent eligibility. Instead, it is
patent applicants, scientific inventors, who are deciding matters of
high public policy through the contents of the applications they file
with the USPTO.
This Article explores how the United States has come to be in this
position, exposes latent problems with the 'patent first" approach,
and considers the benefits and disadvantages of the "ask questions
first, patent later" approaches employed by some other countries. The
Article concludes that granting patents on morally controversial
biotech subject matter and then asking whether such inventions
should be patentable is bad policy for the United States and its
patent system, and posits workable, proactive ways for Congress to
successfully guard the patent-eligibility gate.
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INTRODUCTION
In Cloning Trevor,journalist Kyla Dunn chronicles the unsuccess-
ful efforts of a group of scientists at Advanced Cellular Technologies
(ACT) to create an embryonic clone of a two-year-old boy afflicted
with a rare genetic disorder.' Theoretically, the development of such
an embryo, made with one of the boy's skin cells and a donated
human egg, could yield embryonic stem cells which, when injected
back into the boy, might halt and reverse the disorder.2 This effort
is an example of therapeutic cloning-the creation of genetically
modified embryos that ultimately will be destroyed in order to
produce cures for various human ailments.3 By contrast, reproduc-
tive cloning has as its aim the development, also from a genetically
modified embryo, of a fully formed child. Therapeutic cloning is less
abhorrent to many than reproductive cloning, but both are morally
controversial,4 and neither type of research is eligible for federal
1. Kyla Dunn, Cloning Trevor, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 2002, at 31. The efforts were
unsuccessful because the researchers were unable to achieve fusion of the skin cell and donor
egg before Trevor (not his real name) began exhibiting symptoms of the disorder,
necessitating a more conventional, but risky, bone marrow transplant treatment for the boy.
2. Id. at 36.
3. Id. at 31.
4. See Meredith Wadman, Politicians Accused of 'Shooting from the Hip' on Human
Cloning, NATURE, Mar. 13, 1997, at 97 (citing an ABC News Nightline poll result that 87%
of respondents believed human cloning should be banned, and 82% believed cloning humans
would be morally wrong). Therapeutic cloning tends to be controversial primarily because
human embryos are destroyed during the process. Reproductive cloning is controversial
because, among other things, there are high failure rates in obtaining cloned creatures, and
most complex clones exhibit genetic abnormalities that may cause them suffering. As one
commentator notes:
SCNT [one method of human cloning] is rarely successful when performed on
complex life forms. As an example, only about 20% of cow clones survive to the
blastocyst stage of embryonic development.... Today about 97% of the simplest
cloned animals die prior to birth in cloning trials.... In general, born clones suffer
from serious-some say "gross--genetic abnormalities and, therefore, live short
lives. This is likely due to dormant genetic abnormalities that blossom with age,
bypassing the protective mechanisms present in germ cells that correct DNA
errors, as well as the chronological age of the DNA inserted into the egg (which
is that of an adult, not an infant).
Nathan A. Adams, IV, Creating Clones, Kids & Chimera: Liberal Democratic Compromise at
the Crossroads, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. PoLY 71, 84-85 (2003). Dolly the cloned
sheep, for example, had to be put down after reaching only half her life expectancy due to
premature aging and disease caused by cloning. See Nicholas Christian, Dolly's Death Fuels
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funding.' Instead, private sector entities, like the ACT researchers
that attempted to clone Trevor, are funding work in these areas.
While federal funding may not be available for cloning research,
federal patent protection, which provides an incentive for private
funding, is available. For example, a cloning patent was issued
to the University of Missouri in April 2001, claiming inventions
directed to, among other things, methods for "producing a cloned
mammal" and for "producing a cloned mammalian embryo."6
Moreover, the patent disclosure states that "the present invention
encompasses the living, cloned products produced by each of the
methods described herein."7 The patent and news reports of other
human cloning activity drew critical reaction, commentary, and calls
for legislative action from a variety of sources.' However, none of the
proposed amendments, either to ban patents on cloning or to ban
cloning research, have been enacted to date.9
Cloning Debate, SCOTLAND ON SUNDAY (Feb. 16, 2002), at httpJ/www.news.scotsman.com/
topics.cfm?id=197102003.
5. See Dunn, supra note 1, at 32; see also Memorandum on the Prohibition on Federal
Funding for Cloning of Human Beings, 33 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. DOC. 281 (Mar. 4, 1997). The
federal government has banned federal funding of human embryo research since December
1994. However, because the restrictions "(did] not explicitly cover human embryos created for
implantation and [did] not cover all Federal agencies," President Clinton felt the need for an
order specifically prohibiting federal funding of human cloning research. Id.
6. U.S. Patent No. 6,211,429 (issued Apr. 3, 2001).
7. Id. (emphasis added). Because there are no claims in the patent to any products of the
method, and the claims define the scope of the invention to which patent rights attach, the
University has no direct patent-based property interest in any such clones. See 35 U.S.C. §
112 (2000). See also Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir.
1995), affd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) ("The written description part of the specification itself does
not delimit the right to exclude. That is the function and purpose of claims."). However, under
35 U.S.C. § 271(g), the University has the right to exclude clones produced by the patented
process from entering the United States. Thus the patent claims can be said to indirectly
encompass human beings.
8. See, e.g., Group Faults PTO for Issuing Patent on "Method of Producing a Cloned
Mammal", 64 [May-Oct.] Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1574, at 81 (May 3,2002)
[hereinafter Group Faults PTO] (discussing the Center for Technology Assessment's criticism
of the USPTO for issuing the patent); Antonio Regalado, Patent on Human Cloning Is
Granted, Despite Current Policy, WALL ST. J., May 16, 2002, at D3; see also H.R. REP. NO. 108-
018 (2003) (accompanying Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2003).
9. A bill to prohibit human cloning, reproductive and therapeutic alike, passed the
House on February 27, 2003. See Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2003, H.R. 534, 108th
Cong. § 302 (2003). None of the proposed amendments, either to ban patents on cloning or to
ban cloning research, have been enacted to date.
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Why is the federal government granting exclusive property rights,
which in effect act as indirect research funding, in inventions for
which it will not, for public policy reasons, provide direct research
funding? Patents can be seen as a type of indirect funding because
they provide incentives for parties to undertake expensive and
risky research.' ° Patents induce upfront funding of projects with
the expectation that monopoly profits can be generated over the
long term." This situation, which appears inconsistent, does not
necessarily involve active and deliberate congressional authoriza-
tion of patents on such morally controversial inventions. Rather,
Congress simply may not appreciate the ramifications of its inaction
in sustaining the current "patent first, ask questions later" U.S.
patent regime.
Under a "patent first, ask questions later" approach, a patent
issues, and to the extent its claimed subject matter conflicts with
norms or values held by a meaningful portion of society, the patent
generates, among other things, public expressions of outrage, ques-
tions of how it issued in the first place, and often calls for Congress
to address the perceived problem legislatively. The U.S. "patent
first" approach has the potential in areas to create problems in a
variety of technical disciplines and only tangentially related to
morality concerns. 2 The problems the approach creates with regard
10. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J.
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 137, 144 (2000) ("One of the reasons people are patenting at a
very early stage in the process is precisely in order to attract or appease venture capital. That
is, they get patents in order to define their market model for their financiers."); Clarisa Long,
Patent Signals, 69 U. Cm. L. REv. 625, 653 (2002) ("Among venture capitalists, both the
quantity and quality of patents have long been factors that are taken into consideration when
deciding whether to invest in a company, particularly in its early stages."); Jasemine C.
Chambers, Note, Patent Eligibility ofBiotechnological Inventions in the United States, Europe,
and Japan: How Much Patent Policy Is Public Policy?, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 223,225
(2002) ("Patents help attract the investments needed to continue research and facilitate the
relationship between government, academia and the private sector.... [Tihe potential to
protect the fruits of expensive research speeds up the research process as well.").
11. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights
and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1037 (1989) (discussing theories that patents
provide incentives to innovate and obtain future patents).
12. For example, the issuance of patents on business methods, while not overtly
implicating moral concerns, has generated quite a bit of controversy and congressional action
that arguably would have been better addressed pre-issuance. See, e.g., Margo A. Bagley,
Internet Business Model Patents, Obvious by Analogy, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv.
253 (2001); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16
474 [Vol. 45:469
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to morally controversial biotech subject matter, however, make a
compelling case for why congressional action in this area is neces-
sary and long overdue. For this reason, this Article focuses on issues
raised by the lack of any morality-based limits on biotech patent
subject matter. 13
Biotechnology is an area in which many morally questionable
inventions are generated. 14 Controversial patented biotech inven-
tions include: isolated genes, sequenced DNA, medical procedures,
embryonic stem cells, genetically modified transgenic animals, and
methods of cloning mammals."' The moral controversies surround-
ing these and other biotech inventions stem from several concerns
including those arising from the mixing of human and animal spe-
cies, the denigration of human dignity, the destruction of potential
human life, and the ownership of humans.1" The availability of a
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263 (2000); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six
Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System
Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 580 (1999); Malla Pollack, The Multiple
Unconstitutionality ofBusiness Method Patents: Common Sense, Congressional Consideration,
and Constitutional History, 28 RUTGERs COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 61 (2002); John R. Thomas,
The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139 (1999); Kathleen Ellis, Net
Patent Bill Introduced, Wa EDNEWS, at httpJ/www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,39238,00.
html (Oct. 3,2000). A full discussion of problems with a 'patent first" approach outside of the
context of morally controversial biotech patents is beyond the scope of this Article.
13. For purposes of this Article, the phrase 'morally controversial biotech inventions (or
subject matter)* is used to denote biotechnology-related inventions that provoke public
controversy because of personal or societal beliefs that it is either right or wrong, "moral or
immoral,' to engage in such research or own such inventions. See WEBS'rimS NEW WORLD
DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 402 (1996) (defining morality as "rightness or wrongness, as of
an action'). A discussion of various theories of morality and law is beyond the scope of this
Article, as it is not my objective in this piece to advocate a particular moral theory of patent
subject matter, but rather to identify and address the absence of any moral limits on patent
subject matter in the U.S. patent system.
14. The term 'biotechnology" refers to "the use of biological organisms for commercial
ends." Adams, supra note 4, at 79. The importance of biotechnology to our society cannot be
over stated. "[B]iotechnology is leading to a more radical transformation of the political
economy than any previous cluster of innovations, because it will impact not merely our tools,
but our species." Id. at 72.
15. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,200,806 (issued Mar. 13,2001) (stem cells); U.S. Patent No.
6,211,429 (issued Apr. 3,2001) (mammalian cloning); U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (issued Apr.
12, 1988) (transgenic nonhuman mammal).
16. See, e.g., Natalie Dewitt, Biologists Divided over Proposal to Create Human.Mouse
Embryos, 420 NATURE 255 (2002); Gilbert Meilander, The Point of a Ban: Or, How to Think
About Stem Cell Research, 31 HASTINGS CTR RPT. 9, 12 (2001); Francis Fukuyama, Sorry, but
Your Soul Just Died, GUARDAN, May 13, 2002, at 2; Carol Grunewald, Monsters of the Brave
New World, NEW INT R&NATIONALIST, at httpJ/www.newint.orgissue215/monsters.htm (Jan.
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government imprimatur granting exclusive rights over morally
controversial inventions is especially problematic in the area of bio-
technology because no one should "own" and the government should
not encourage certain inventions.
17
The U.S. patent system has not always had this "patent first"
approach to moral issues. For many years a judicially created
"moral utility" doctrine served as a type of gatekeeper of patent-
eligible subject matter. The doctrine allowed both the USPTO and
courts to deny patents on morally controversial subject matter
under the fiction that such inventions were not "useful."8 The gate,
however, is currently untended, as a result ofjudicial decisions that
interpreted the scope of the statutory utility and subject matter
standards under the Patent Act of 1952 in a way that left no room
1991); William Krystol, Brave New Patents, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, at httpJ/www.
weeklystandard.com/Content/PublicArticles/000/000/O0l1l62ruhsv.asp (May 27, 2002);
Dashka Slater, HuMouse, LEGAL AFFAIRS, at http'/Avww.legalaffairs.org/issues/November-
December-2002/featureslater..novdec2002.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2003). As Drs. Maureen
and Samuel Condic note:
The rapid pace of [biotech] advancement raises very real moral and prudential
questions.... [Miodern biology has ... brought to light the question of when (and
where) we become "alive" and when we become "dead." Since much of what
science discovers is so completely removed from previous experiences, how are
sound moral and prudential judgments to be made? Given that prudence
demands that dangerous technologies be controlled and decency demands that
evil technologies be prohibited, we are left with the question of exactly when a
technology becomes dangerous or evil.... [No other field raises issues as
profound or as critical to our self-conception, our values, and our very lives.
Maureen L. Condic & Samuel B. Condic, The Appropriate Limits of Science in the Formation
of Public Policy, 17 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 157, 159-60 (2003).
17. Patent protection has often been justified on the basis that intellectual property is a
"public good." See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Authors, Publishers, and Public Goods: Trading
Gold for Dross, 36 LOy. L.A. L. REV. 159, 164 (2002). As Professor Gordon explains:
A "public good" is a good that can be shared non-rivalrously by many and from
whose use non-payors are not easily physically excluded. Goods with these
characteristics are susceptible to free riding, and thus difficult to produce in a
normal competitive market. Inventions and works of authorship are "public
goods" whose creation is stimulated by the limited private exclusion rights
known as patent and copyright. Lighthouses and public defense are "public
goods" for which governments usually provide direct support.
Id. The primary reason for granting exclusive patent rights is to provide incentives for the
production of inventive public goods that would otherwise be under produced. For some
morally controversial biotech inventions, countervailing policies militate against government
encouragement and private ownership of such subject matter. As will be discussed, which
inventions fall into this category is a hard question that Congress must answer.
18. See discussion infra Part I.B.
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for a moral utility doctrine.' 9 Beginning in 1980 with Diamond v.
Chakrabarty° and continuing to the present,2 the Supreme Court
has expansively and consistently held that Congress intended the
definition of subject matter eligible for protection under the 1952
Patent Act to include any type of living or nonliving matter, as
long as it is "made by man."22 Combining these decisions with the
Court's generous deference to Congress in Intellectual Property
Clause matters' means that no explicit basis exists for denying
patent protection to otherwise patentable, morally controversial
subject matter, and has in fact issued several patents that encom-
pass humans, despite its earlier pronouncements.24
Members of Congress may not appreciate fully this change of
events because of statements by the USPTO declaring that it would
deny patents on certain morally controversial inventions for public
policy or, in the case of inventions comprising humans, Thirteenth
Amendment reasons. 25 Members of Congress have cited such state-
ments in arguments against specific legislation directed at banning
human-cloning patents.' The USPTO, however, is claiming power
that it does not have. The Supreme Court has already interpreted
the patent statute without reference to any limits based on moral
considerations and the idea that the Thirteenth Amendment could
support the denial of patents, on genetically modified previable
fetuses for example, is doctrinally unsound. The USPTO thus lacks
19. See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 533 (1966); Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange
Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
20. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
21. The Court's most recent pronouncement came in J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-
Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 134 (2001).
22. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
23. As exhibited in the 2003 decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
24. See infra note 182.
25. See, e.g., Media Advisory, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Facts on Patenting Life
Forms Having a Relationship to Humans (Apr. 1, 1998), available at http/A/www.uspto.gov/
wehtofficeslcom/speeches/98-06.htm [hereinafter Media Advisory]; see also Nonnaturally
Occurring Non-Human Animals Are Patentable Under § 101, 33 Pat. Trademark & Copyright
J. (BNA) No. 827, at 664 (Apr. 23, 1987) [hereinafter Non-Human Animals).
26. See discussion infra Part II.A.1.d.
27. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973) (concluding that the word "person" as used
in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn). Moreover, the Supreme Court
has defined slavery narrowly under the Thirteenth Amendment in a series of cases. See, e.g.,
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36
(1873).
2003] 477
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the authority to deny patents on morally controversial inventions,
even ones that comprise human genetic subject matter, and has in
fact issued patents encompassing human genetic subject matter,
despite earlier pronouncements. 28
Further complicating congressional action to address the patent
eligibility of morally controversial biotech subject matter may be
misunderstandings of the basic nature of the U.S. patent-grant
system. The Patent Act of 1952 entitles a person to a patent her
invention if it meets the statutory requirements for patentability,
which include novelty, utility, and nonobviousness. 2 As most of the
morally controversial biotech inventions are new 30 and targeted at
curing human disease, if only tangentially such express statutory
requirements have not and likely will not prove too difficult to
surmount. In the absence of statutory limits, researchers and their
patent attorneys are making patent policy and determining the
limits of patent eligibility by the subject matter described in their
patent applications.1 Congress may not be aware that inaction on
its part has placed patent applicants in the position of de facto
arbiters of patent eligibility, thereby providing private entities with
incentives, via granted patents, to develop and exploit morally
controversial inventions without engaging in any analysis of the
policy implications of such decisions. As a result, Congress may be
forced to debate, in the not too distant future, whether patents on
human-animal chimera, or genetically modified previability fetuses,
developed to be destroyed in the fight against some dreaded disease,
should have been granted. 2
28. See discussion infra Part II.A.l.d.
29. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2000).
30. This is true at least under current judicial interpretations of the novelty requirement.
See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (indicating that a gene
must be isolated and purified to be considered a novel invention); Merck & Co. v. Olin-
Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1958) (finding that a compound containing
fermentation-derived B-12 represented a novel invention based on its tremendous therapeutic
and commercial value); Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co., 196 F.496 (2d. Cir. 1912)
(affirming trial court finding that a patent for a purified form of adrenaline was valid and
infringed); In re Williams, 171 F.2d 319 (C.C.P.A. 1948) (holding that a compound containing
only the "laevo rotary" form of butyro lactone represented a novel invention).
31. See Gary Stix, Make Your Own Rules: Patents Let Private Parties Take the Law into
Their Own Hands, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Apr. 14, 2003, at http'/iwww.sciam.com/
article.cfm?articlelD=0006E2EC-C9DA.1ESC-8EA5809EC5880000&catID=2.
32. See discussion infra Part III.A.
478 [Vol. 45:469
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Facially, the U.S. "patent first" approach appears to reflect a
normative congressional choice of a system that defaults in favor of
patent eligibility while leaving specific subject matter exclusions
for subsequent reactive legislation. However, appearances can be
deceiving. Congress could certainly have chosen to create a "patent
first" system in which advancing technology was the only concern.
Alternatively, Congress could acquiesce in the operation of such a
system by declining to enact legislation to correct it. A variety of
evidence suggests, however, that Congress has not intentionally
created such a system, nor intentionally acquiesced in such a
system.33 Rather, as posited in this Article, Congress believes that
there are pre-issuance barriers to patentability in the system, is
"unaware" of the complete lack of morality-based limits in the
current system, and has yet to speak definitively on this issue.3
Without statutory bars to the issuance of morally controversial
patents, the public and Congress are continually in a reactive
instead of proactive mode in assessing the potential impact of
patenting such subject matter. Issues surrounding takings and
government interference with property rights and contractual
relations complicate and confound Congress' ability to adequately
define patent eligible subject matter after the fact.35 In addition, a
lack of public understanding regarding how the patent system
operates likely traps some people in the "is-ought fallacy;" the
erroneous assumption that because the law allows some governmen-
tal action, such as the issuance of a morally controversial patent,
that action must be proper.' Finally, as with therapeutic cloning,
33. See discussion infra Part III.B.
34. I say Congress has not intentionally acquiesced, because Congress, as a body, is
"unaware" of this situation in the way the proverbial ostrich that sticks its head in the sand
when trouble approaches is unaware of the problem it is facing. Congress, however, has had
plenty of warning, and explicit indications that the current *patent first" order is problematic.
See discussion infra Part II.A.
'35. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MoRALIT OF LAW 53 (1964) (discussing retroactive laws
and morality); POLLY J. PRICE, PROPERTY RIGHTS 140-47 (2003) (discussing takings issues
with government intervention in patent rights); Courtenay C. Brinckerhoff, Medical Method
Patents and the Fifth Amendment: Do the New Limits on Enforceability Effect a Taking?, 4 U.
BALT. INTELL PROP. L.J. 147, 177 (1996) (discussing takings issues with government
intervention in patent rights).
36. Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1079
(2003) (citing DAViD Humz, A TREATIS E OF HUMAN NATuRE 293-306 (David F. Norton & Mary
J. Norton eds., 2000)).
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the ends to be achieved by exploitation of these patents, such as
curing serious human ailments, are seductively desirable and
politically explosive.3 7 These factors combine to make the necessary,
but ex post, inquiry into whether the morally controversial "means"
to achieve these desirable ends are appropriate subjects for patent
protection, exceedingly difficult to undertake.
A different order or type of inquiry, such as determining patent
subject matter eligibility before a patent issues, could provide a way
to improve the current state of affairs. It makes little sense to
execute people and then try to ask them questions regarding their
guilt or innocence (i.e., whether it was "right" to execute them).'
Similarly, granting patents on morally controversial biotech subject
matter and then asking whether such inventions should be patent-
able is a problematic policy for the United States and its patent
system. Interestingly, other countries have taken "ask questions
first, then patent" approaches to morally controversial subject
matter that, while imperfect, provide illustrative alternatives to the
haphazard course the United States is currently pursuing. 9 The
most recent example is the December 2002 decision of the Canadian
Supreme Court excluding higher life forms from patent protection
without an express statutory authorization from Parliament.'
Admittedly, while a "patent first" approach is problematic, good
reasons clearly exist for leaving questions of morality out of
patent law. Some commentators point to the patent system being
ill-equipped to engage in such inquiries that are better left to
regulatory agencies."' Others correctly note that denying patents on
37. See, e.g., Dunn, supra note 1, at 49 (quoting Trevor's mother as saying "it's like [a ban
on human cloning], how dare they tell me that I cannot save my son's life?"); Fukuyama, supra
note 16, at 2 ("[Bliotechnology, in contrast to many other scientific advances, mixes obvious
benefits with subtle harms in one seamless package.").
38. Admittedly, the analogy is imperfect. When someone is executed, she is destroyed.
When a patent is granted, a new right is created. Nevertheless, in both cases, an inquiry
should have taken place before the government takes decisive action (which cannot be undone
in one case and not easily undone in the other).
39. See discussion infra Part II.B.
40. See Harvard Coll. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2002] SCC 76, 219 D.L.R.
(4th) 577.
41. See, e.g., James R. Chiapetta, Comment, Of Mice and Machine: A Paradigmatic
Challenge to Interpretation of the Patent Statute, 20 WM. MITCHFLL L. REv. 155, 178 (1994)
("The proper venue for consideration of moral issues of biotechnology is within the regulatory
agency entrusted with the product's oversight, not the PTO."); Cynthia M. Ho, Note, Building
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morally controversial inventions will not stop the underlying
research that is the source of public concern.42 Still others posit that
failing to grant patents on promising technology, perhaps because
of public misunderstandings of science, may hinder important
discoveries and deny life-saving cures to millions.3 In essence they
argue that the system is not broken, and to the extent it is, it would
be better not to fix it because the solution-any type of morality-
based limitation--could be far worse than the current problem.
This Article analyzes such arguments against morality-based
patent legislation in light of the larger themes of institutional
competence and federal patent policy. By identifying which actor
has the institutional competence to make decisions of high public
policy, as well as which actor is actually making such decisions, the
Article exposes a key flaw in the current system that requires a
remedy." Also, the Article posits that framing the issue of patent
eligibility with reference to the policies Congress seeks to effectuate
via the patent system further supports the conclusion that legisla-
tive action is indeed necessary, though not free from risk.
Part I of the Article provides an introduction to the subject matter
and utility requirements of the U.S. patent statute which provide
a Better Mousetrap: Patenting Biotechnology in the European Community, 3 DUKE J. COMP.
& INTL L. 173, 195 (1992) ("[The grant of a patent is not an ethical event. Instead it is the
regulatory system of a given nation that monitors social concerns as it implements general
legislation--concerns which frequently encompass ethics and morality.")
42. See, e.g., Thomas A. Magnani, The Patentability of Human-Animal Chimeras, 14
BEKELEYTECH. L.J. 443,459 (1999) ("The ethical concerns ... about biotechnology inventions
do not actually relate to the patenting of such inventions, but to whether these inventions
should be created at all."); Carrie F. Walker, Note, Beyond the Harvard Mouse: Current Patent
Practice and the Necessity of Clear Guidelines in Biotechnology Patent Law, 73 IND. L.J. 1025,
1026 (1998) ("Eventually, it will become apparent that the root of the debate about patents
for biotechnology has less to do with patent law, and more to do with fundamental concerns
about the science itself.*).
43. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The Patent
System and Controversial Technologies, 47 MD. L. REV. 1051, 1075 (1988) ("Patents on new
technology should be granted, reserving the right to regulate specific applications. This is the
only sensible course."); Keith Schneider, Harvard Gets Mouse Patent, A World First, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 13,1988, at A22 (quoting then-Commissioner of Patents Donald J. Quigg as citing
the transgenic mouse's potential to hasten the development of cancer treatments as an
important factor in granting the patent and saying, "but how can anybody say this kind of
development is unethical or wrong?").
44. The actors could be Congress, the judiciary, the executive branch, or the scientific
community. The U.S. Constitution leaves the choice of actor and type of patent system
effectively up to Congress. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2003]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
the basis for most arguments concerning the patentability of
morally controversial biotech inventions. Part I focuses on the
historical role of the judicially created "moral utility" requirement
and describes the reasons for its demise.' Part II contrasts the
U.S. approach in which the USPTO issues a patent on a morally
controversial biotech invention and then Congress, the courts, and
others debate whether such subject matter should be patentable,
with the approach of other countries that have statutory barriers to
the issuance of morally controversial biotech patents.' Such
provisions, in theory and as exemplified in recent cases, allow for
some type of discussion to take place regarding possible moral
issues related to otherwise patentable subject matter before a
patent finally issues. Informed by the analyses of Parts I and II,
Part III identifies Congress as the actor most competent to define
patent subject matter eligibility and explores legislative options
for including moral issues in federal patent policy without signifi-
cantly hampering the development of U.S. patent law. The Article
concludes that if Congress does not set limits on patenting morally
controversial subject matter, no one will, and asking patent ques-
tions "later" will one day be too late.
I. PATENT ELIGIBILITY47
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution authorizes
Congress "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."45 At the time
45. All commentators do not agree that the moral utility requirement is defunct and some
even argue for its application to biotech inventions. However, as will be explained in Part I,
any notion that a moral utility requirement still exists in U.S. patent law is fallacy, not fact.
See discussion infra Part I.B.
46. It should be noted that not all of the statutory barriers to be discussed explicitly
address biotech inventions; some affect any morally controversial invention. See, e.g.,
European Patent Convention, art. 53(a) (July 2002), available at http://www.european-patent-
office.org/epc/pdfe.htm [hereinafter EPC Article 53(a)].
47. The phrase "patent eligibility" generally refers solely to whether an invention
comprises subject matter that falls within one of the four section 101 categories. See MARTIN
J. ADELMAN ETAL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 83 (1998). In this Article, however,
the phrase will be used to refer to both section 101 determinations, subject matter and utility,
because questions of the morality of an invention implicate beth requirements.
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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the framers crafted this language, the word "science" did not have
the specialized meaning that it has today. Instead, "science"
referred to knowledge generally and has been understood to provide
the basis for the U.S. copyright system.'9 Consequently, the
promotion of progress in the "useful arts" is the basis for Congress'
authority to create a patent system.5° Congress chose to promote
progress in the useful arts by establishing a patent system whereby
in exchange for adequately disclosing a useful, novel, and non-
obvious invention5' to the public in a patent document, an inventor
49. See H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 4 (1952); S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 3 (1952), reprinted in
1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2396.
50. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 958 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
51. The disclosure requirements (written description, enablement, best mode, and distinct
claiming) are codified in 35 U.S.C. § 112, in the first paragraph, which provides, in pertinent
part:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains ... to make
and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out his invention.
Id. 35 U.S.C. § 102 contains the novelty requirement and provides, in pertinent part, that:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the in-
vention thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a
foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year
prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States, or
(c) he has abandoned the invention, or
(d) the invention was first patented ... by the applicant or his legal represen-
tatives or assigns in a foreign country prior to the date of the application for
patent in this country ... filed more than twelve months before the filing of the
application in the United States, or
(e) the invention was described in (1) an application for patent, published ... by
another filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant ... or (2)
a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the United
States before the invention by the applicant for patent,...; or
(M he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented, or
(g) ... (2) before such person's invention thereof, the invention was made in this
country by another inventor who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed
it ....
Id. The nonobviousness requirement is codified at 35 U.S.C. § 103 which provides, in
pertinent part:
(a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically
disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that
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would obtain a right to exclude others from making, using, selling,
or offering to sell the invention for a period of years.52
Section 101 of the current patent statute 3 contains the require-
ment that an invention be useful in order to be patented, which is
why inventions qualifying under that provision are called "utility"
patents.5 4 In addition to being useful, however, § 101 also requires
the invention to be of the right type. The patent statute provides
that: "whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject
to the conditions and requirements of this title."5 These two
requirements, utility and type or subject matter, are the battlefield
on which most disputes regarding morally controversial biotech
inventions have traditionally been fought.
A Subject Matter: "Anything Under the Sun Made by Man"
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides for the grant of patents
only on new and useful processes, machines, articles of manufac-
ture, and compositions of matter. The four subject matter categories
of§ 101 are not mutually exclusive; an invention can be classifiable
in more than one category.TM Likewise, an inventor need not specify
which category her invention is properly classified in as long as it
can be encompassed within one of the four. The Supreme Court has
determined that abstract ideas that have not been reduced to a
functional form, natural phenomena such as uncultivated plants
found in the wild, and laws of nature such as E = mc2 are categories
the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains.
leL
52. The original patent term was fourteen years from issuance. "An Act to promote the
progress of useful Arts." Patent Act, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 110 (1790) (current version at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 154, 271 (2000)). It is currently twenty years from the filing date, with the possibility of
extensions for delays not attributable to acts or omissions of the inventor.
53. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-300 (2000).
54. In addition to utility patents, the patent statute also provides for the issuance of
design patents on ornamental designs for articles of manufacture and plant patents on
asexually reproduced plants. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 161, 171 (2000).
55. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (emphasis added).
56. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305-06 (1980).
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of subject matter outside the four comers of § 101.17 The justifica-
tions for such exclusions are the wording of the statute identifying
four specific subject matter categories and a policy determination
that patents should not be granted on subject matter that is not
new or that consists of fundamental principles regarding the way
the world works, principles that should be free for all to use.58 The
apparent breadth of these exclusions, however, is considerably
narrower now than twenty-five years ago due to a series of judicial
decisions that have carved out portions of the public domain (certain
types of abstract ideas and natural phenomena) and made them
eligible for utility patent protection.5 9
"Anything under the sun that is made by man" has been the
mantra for the unprecedented expansion in patent-eligible subject
matter articulated by the Supreme Court over the past twenty-plus
years.'o The Court lifted the phrase from the legislative history
of the Patent Act of 1952 as evidence of the wide scope Congress
57. The Court stated that:
This is not to suggest that § 101 has no limits or that it embraces every
discovery. The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have
been held not patentable.... Thus, a new mineral discovered in the earth or a
new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein
could not patent his celebrated law that E=mc2 ; nor could Newton have patented
the law of gravity. Such discoveries are "manifestations of ... nature, free to all
men and reserved exclusively to none."
Id. at 309.
58. Id.
59. See Charles R. McManis, Re-Engineering Patent Law: The Challenge of New
Technologies, 2 WAsH. U. J.L. & POLY 1, 3 (2000). In describing the expansion of patent-
eligible subject matter, Professor McManis notes:
[Platent protection for inventions has been held to exclude any protection for
abstract ideas, natural laws, or principles, and phenomena of nature. For a time
courts also purported to exclude business methods from the subject matter of
protection. Today, however, inventors of software-related inventions have come
perilously close to obtaining patents on mathematical algorithms .... Likewise,
biotechnology patents have come very close to claiming phenomena of
nature-namely isolated genetic sequences.... The result has been ... "[a] patent
gold rush," in which "inventions long thought unpatentable-everything from
gene sequences of unknown function to one-step purchasing over the Internet-
are now being claimed as property."
Id. (citing Arti Rai, Addressing the Patent Gold Rush: The Role of Deference to PTO Patent
Denials, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POLVY 199 (2000)).
60. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 ("Congress intended statutory subject matter to include
'anything under the sun that is made by man.') (citing S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R.
REP. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).
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intended for § 101. The phrase provided the basis for the Court's
path-breaking conclusion in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, that living
organisms, namely, a man-made bacterium with properties unlike
any known naturally occurring organism, comprised patent eligible
subject matter.61 The phrase was also repeated by the Court in
Diamond v. Diehr, a case that involved the claimed use of a law of
nature in a computerized manufacturing process and laid the
groundwork for utility patents on computer software.62 Most re-
cently, in J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International,
Inc., which relied heavily on the Chakrabarty decision, the Court
again trotted out the phrase in support of its holding that sexually
and asexually reproducible plants can be the subject of utility
patents, despite Congress' enactment of more specific statutory
protection schemes for both types of plants.' Moreover, in State
Street Bank and Trust v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, following the Supreme Court's
lead, expanded patent-eligible subject matter to include business
methods." State Street opened the doors of the USPTO to a flood of
patent applications from traditionally nontechnical disciplines
such as the accounting and financial services industries.
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Court gave a green light to
biotech researchers and investors by confirming that "life" can
61. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313. A much earlier decision, Parke-DavW & Co. v. H.K.
Mulford & Co., 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912), in combination with Chakrabarty, set the stage for
the patenting of genes, DNA, and other naturally occurring biological material isolated from,
and in a purified state, relative to its natural condition. However, as with abstract ideas, how
subject matter is defined impacts its patent eligibility. The allowance of patents in isolated
genes and purified DNA narrows the scope of "natural phenomena" that is in the public
domain and not eligible for patent protection.
62. 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981); see, e.g., AT&T v. Excel Communications, 172 F.3d 1352,
1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc). In a
previous decision, Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1997), the Court had invalidated a patent
on a similar process because it was deemed to comprise an abstract idea. To the extent
computer software and/or business methods do consist of abstract ideas, such subject matter
is, by judicial decree, no longer part of the public domain but is now eligible for patent
protection. See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 1998); Thomas, supra note 12.
63. 534 U.S. 124, 134 (2001).
64. State St., 149 F.3d at 1375. Although the Court's discussion of the business method
exception was dicta, the decision cleared the way for such patents and business method patent
applications flooded into the USPTO in the wake of the decision. See, e.g., Bagley, supra note
12, at 256; Thomas, supra note 12, at 1140.
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comprise patent-eligible subject matter under § 101.' The
Chakrabarty case presented the Court with a profoundly important
choice. It could agree with the USPTO and its own advice and
"proceed cautiously when ... asked to extend patent rights into areas
wholly unforeseen by Congress,' by leaving the question of the
patent eligibility of genetic inventions to "[tihe legislative process"
which was "best equipped to weigh the competing economic, social,
and scientific considerations involved." 7 Alternatively, the Court
could conclude that Congress had already spoken and had intended
§ 101 to have a broadly inclusive scope." It chose the latter ap-
proach, with fateful consequences. As explained by the Court, "the
relevant distinction [is] not between living and inanimate things,
but between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-
made inventions."69 Dr. Chakrabarty's oil-eating microorganism
thus qualified as patent-eligible subject matter because it was "a
nonnaturally occurring manufacture ... a product of human ingenu-
ity."70
Acknowledging the possible repercussions of its decision, the
Court adverted to a "gruesome parade of horribles"71 cited by the
USPTO and amici as potentially resulting from patents on genetic
research:
We are told that genetic research and related technological
developments may spread pollution and disease, that it may
result in a loss of genetic diversity, and that its practice may
tend to depreciate the value of human life. These arguments are
forcefully, even passionately, presented; they remind us that, at
times, human ingenuity seems unable to control fully the forces
it creates-that, with Hamlet, it is sometimes better "to bear
those ills we have than fly to others that we know not of."72
65. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313.
66. Id. at 315 (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978)).
67. Id.
68. See id. at 313.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 309.
71. Id. at 316.
72. Id. Jeremy Rifkin co-authored an amicus brief in the Chakrabarty case that listed
some of the items in that parade:
Scenarios which once appeared far-fetched-the manufacturing of mammals,
including human beings, to specification; the creation of super-intelligent beings;
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The Court, however, declared itself to be "without competence" even
to entertain such morality-laden "high policy" arguments.73 In
broadly construing § 101, the Court circumscribed its ability to
impose any moral limits on subject-matter eligibility. Rather, it
identified its role as "the narrow one of determining what Congress
meant by the words it used in the statute; once that is done, our
powers are exhausted.... [U]ntil Congress takes ... action, this Court
must construe the language of § 101 as it is."7 4
Having thus emphatically interpreted the statute to encompass
any invention "made by man," the Court is without competence to
exclude such inventions from patent eligibility by its own admission.
Like Dr. Chakrabarty's oil-eating bacterium, the morally controver-
sial biotech inventions presented to the USPTO generally involve
human manipulation of genetic material. Consequently, the § 101
subject matter prong of patent eligibility does not provide any bar
to the patenting of morally controversial biotech subject matter.
B. Utility: "Useful" Does Not Mean "Moral"
Section 101 of the Patent Act authorizes the issuance of patents
only for "useful" inventions.75 For the vast majority of inventions,
the utility requirement is a low hurdle to overcome. According to
USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines, it is sufficient to meet the
the asexual reproduction of organisms through cloning; the advent of genetic
surgery designed to alter the heredity of complex organisms-will become
science fact, if not tomorrow, then certainly within the lifetimes of the majority
of Americans.
Slater, supra note 16. Over twenty years later, Rilkin considers his early concerns justified,
as patents have issued covering many of these items. See id.
73. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 317.
74. Id. at 318. The Court recently reaffirmed its deferential role in reviewing
congressional enactments under the Constitution's Intellectual Property Clause in Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003). While Eldred is not a patent case, the Court employed
analogies to patent law in reaching its conclusion that it lacked authority to strike down the
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998. The Court concluded its decision by stating that "[tihe
wisdom of Congress' action, however, is not within our province to second guess. Satisfied that
the legislation before us remains inside the domain the Constitution assigns to the First
Branch, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals." Id. at 222. Of course, if the Court
perceived a constitutional conflict, for example, between the Thirteenth Amendment and
patents on constitutionally protected humans (e.g., viable fetuses), it likely would act.
75. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
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requirement if a patent application recites at least one "specific,
substantial, and credible" use for an invention.76
Historically, however, establishing utility was not always an easy
task. Fairly early in the development of patent law, the courts
considered the morality of an invention in the context of the utility
requirement. Justice Story is credited with providing the first ar-
ticulation of the doctrine as he instructed the jury in the 1817
Lowell v. Lewis decision.7 7 As he explained, "[a]ll that the law
requires is that the invention should not be frivolous or injurious
to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society. The word
'useful,' therefore, is incorporated into the act in contradistinction
to mischievous or immoral."78
Justice Story's language provided the foundation for what came
to be known as the "moral utility" doctrine; the idea that to be
"useful" within the meaning of the patent statute, and thus eligible
for patent protection, an invention had to meet certain judicially
identified standards of morality. For over 150 years, courts cited
this requirement as the basis for rejecting a variety of morally
controversial inventions, including gambling machines 79 and
fraudulent articles80
Not surprisingly, courts began to whittle away at the scope of the
requirement as societal views on morality shifted and difficulties
in defining morally acceptable inventions multiplied. Instead of
an invention being ineligible for patent protection if it could be
used unlawfully, the test developed that an invention could meet
the moral utility requirement if it had at least one moral, legal
76. Examination Guidelines for the Utility Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1098 (Jan.
5, 2001) [hereinafter Examination Guidelines]. The Utility Examination Guidelines are
instructions to be used by USPTO examiners when assessing the patentability of a claimed
invention.
77. 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568).
78. Id. at 1019 (emphasis added).
79. See, e.g., Brewer v. Lichtenstein, 278 F. 512 (7th Cir. 1922) (vending device"); Meyer
v. Buckley Mfg. Co., 15 F. Supp. 640 (N.D. Ill. 1936) (novelty vending machine); Schultze v.
Holtz, 82 F. 448 (N.D. Cal. 1897) (coin-controlled apparatus used for gambling purposes); Nati
Automatic Device Co. v. Lloyd, 40 F. 89 (N.D. ll. 1889) ("toy automatic race-course" used
solely for gambling purposes).
80. See, e.g., Scott & Williams, Inc. v. Aristo Hosiery Co., 7 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1925)
(seamless "seamed" stockings); Mahler v. Animarium Co., 111 F. 530 (8th Cir. 1901)
(incredible medical device); Rickard v. Du Bon, 103 F. 868 (2d Cir. 1900) (process for
"spotting" tobacco leaves).
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purpose."' As articulated by the USPTO Board of Patent Appeals
and Interferences, the test for utility under § 101 was a simple one:
"[Elverything [is] useful within the meaning of the law, if it is used
(or designed and adapted to be used) to accomplish a good result,
though in fact it is oftener used (or is as well or even better adapted
to be used) to accomplish a bad one[.]' 2
Eventually, however, courts began refusing to impose the require-
ment at all. The courts acknowledged that it was an area in which
Congress could legislate, but that such determinations were not the
proper purview of the judiciary or the USPTO.'
In 1998, however, the moral utility doctrine seemed on the
verge of revival when the USPTO threatened to invoke the re-
quirement in response to receiving a controversial patent applica-
tion. The application, filed by activist Jeremy Rifkin and biologist
Stuart Newman, claimed the invention of human-animal chimera,
creatures made, in theory, by blending human cells with those of
various animals such as mice, chimpanzees, pigs, or baboons.' The
applicants actually have not made such creatures, nor do they want
anyone else to make them.' Rather, their purpose in filing the
application was to provoke a debate and force Congress, the courts,
or the USPTO to draw the line on patent-eligible subject matter.8
81. See Fuller v. Berger, 120 F. 274, 275 (7th Cir. 1903) (identifying a test for no lack of
utility as whether the invention "is incapable of serving any beneficial end").
82. Exparte Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 801, 802 (Bd. App. 1977).
83. See, e.g., Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(refusing to invalidate patent on deceptive device); Whistler Corp. v. Autotronics, Inc., 14
U.S.P.Q.2d 1885, 1886 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (refusing to invalidate radar detector patent for lack
of utility because [u]nless and until detectors are banned outright, or Congress acts to
withdraw patent protection for them, radar detector patentees are entitled to the protection
of the patent laws").
84. See U.S. Patent Application No. 10,308,135 (filed Dec. 3,2002). Although news reports
mention both Newman and Rifkin as applicants, Newman is listed as the sole inventor on the
application. The applicants even created a trademark for one of the chimera-the humouse.
See Slater, supra note 16.
85. An interesting feature of U.S. patent law is that a patent applicant need not actually
have made an invention in order to be able to patent it. As long as they file a U.S. application
that provides an adequate written description of the invention and would enable persons of
ordinary skill in the art to make and use the invention, not having actually made it
themselves will not impair their ability to patent the claimed invention. ADELMAN ET AL.,
supra note 46, at 329 ('An inventor may reduce an invention to practice in two ways:
constructively, by filing a patent application, and actually, by building and testing a physical
embodiment of the invention.").
86. See, e.g., Cynthia M. Ho, Splicing Morality and Patent Law: Issues Arising From
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Shortly after receiving the chimera application, the USPTO
issued a media advisory entitled Facts on Patenting Life Forms
Having a Relationship to Humans.7 In the advisory, the Office cited
Justice Story's quote in Lowell v. Lewis and posited that "inventions
directed to human/non-human chimera could, under certain
circumstances, not be patentable because, among other things, they
would fail to meet the public policy and morality aspects of the
utility requirement."' Nevertheless, by its own admission in a more
recent statement, the USPTO has acknowledged that it is without
authority to deny a patent based on morality or public policy
concerns and has actually issued several patents that encompass
humans.89 In addressing a comment that the USPTO should deny
patents on DNA for the public good, the Agency stated:
The scope of subject matter that is eligible for a patent, the
requirements that must be met in order to be granted a patent,
and the legal rights that are conveyed by an issued patent, are
all controlled by statutes which the USPTO must administer....
Congress creates the law and the Federal judiciary interprets
the law. The USPTO must administer the laws as Congress has
enacted them and as the Federal courts have interpreted them.
Current law provides that when the statutory patentability
requirements are met, there is no basis to deny patent applica-
tions .... 0
Mixing Mice and Men, 2 WAsH. U. J.L. & POLY 247, 248 (2000); Aaron Zitner, Patently
Provoking a Debate: Two Friends Seek Rights to a Theoretical Human.Mouse, Thought up to
Force Limits on Patenting Human Life, L.A. TIMES, May 12, 2002, at Al.
87. See Media Advisory, supra note 25.
88. Id. A few days later, then-Commissioner of Patents Bruce Lehman re-emphasized the
position of the USPTO with the infamous statement: "there will be no patents on monsters."
"Morality'Aspect of Utility Requirement Can Bar Patent for Part-Human Inventions, 55 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 555-56 (Apr. 9, 1998). Unfortunately for Mr. Lehman, his
promise was broken the moment he made it. At the time of the statement, the USPTO had
already issued several patents on "monsters," animal-animal chimera evocative of the
mythical creature, part goat, part lion, and part serpent from which the name "chimera"
originated. Apparently, the USPTO did not consider animal-animal chimera to be monsters.
The USPTO has rejected the chimera application for several years but ultimately may have
to let a court decide the issue. See Dewitt, supra note 16, at 255.
89. See, e.g., U.S. Patent Nos. 6,511,830 (issued Jan. 28,2003), 6,485,910 (issued Nov. 26,
2002), 6,524,819 (issued Feb. 25,2003), 6,284,456 (issued Sept. 4,2001), and 6,420,149 (issued
July 16, 2002).
90. Examination Guidelines, supra note 76, at 1095.
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If the USPTO persists in maintaining a rejection of the chimera
application claims under the moral utility doctrine, such a rejection
is bound to be overturned in court. Not long after the USPTO's
announcement, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit handed
down a decision in Juicy Whip v. Orange Bang which effectively
sounded the death-knell for the moral utility requirement. 91 In
rejecting an argument that the moral utility requirement should be
applied to invalidate a patent on a deceptive invention, the court
stated:
It has been stated that inventions that are injurious to the well-
being, good policy, or sound morals of society are unpatentable....
[B]ut [this] principle ... has not been applied broadly in recent
years .... As the Supreme Court put the point more generally,
Congress never intended that the patent laws should displace
the police powers of the States, ... those powers by which the
health, good order, peace and general welfare of the community
are promoted.... Of course, Congress is free to declare particular
types of inventions unpatentable for a variety of reasons, in-
cluding deceptiveness .... Until such time as Congress does so,
however, we find no basis in section 101 to hold that inventions
can be ruled unpatentable for lack of utility simply because they
have the capacity to fool some members of the public.'
The judicially created moral utility requirement thus suffered
a judicial demise in complete accord with the Supreme Court's
"anything under the sun made by man" subject-matter interpreta-
tion.9" Nevertheless, based on its statement regarding the chimera
91. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
92. Id. at 1366-68 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
93. See JOHN G. MILLS III ET AL., PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 9:5 (rev. ed. 2003) ("In
light of the Federal Circuit's decision in Juicy Whip v. Orange Bang, it would seem that
immorality or illegality is no longer a bar to an invention's eligibility for a U.S. patent."); see
also DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, POUCY LEVERS IN PATENT LAW 181-83 (Berkeley Olin
Program in Law & Economics Working Paper No. 90, 2003) (outlining how the Federal
Circuit's resistance to patent policy has led the court to eliminate several long-standing patent
law policy doctrines expressly on the basis that no specific statutory authorization supports
their existence). Although one may lament the lack of flexible policy standards for judicial
decision making, the fact remains that the Federal Circuit is unlikely to reverse its position
on the moral utility doctrine, precisely because the requirement cannot be read into the
statute, Congress must explicitly place it there.
The Supreme Court's own last word on utility is not to the contrary. In Brenner u. Manson,
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application, the USPTO may wish to revive the moral utility
requirement to deal with certain morally controversial biotech in-
ventions.9' However, it would be difficult in the extreme to resurrect
a rule which, based on judicial interpretations of 35 U.S.C. § 101,
does not exist under the current patent statute.95 Moreover, the
watered-down moral utility requirement invoked prior to Juicy
Whip would be of little assistance in any event: morally controver-
sial biotech inventions can claim generally at least one legal and
beneficial use, such as to help cure disease.' A better approach
might be to consider ways that other countries have addressed the
patenting of such subject matter in hopes of gleaning useful ideas
to inject into the U.S. system.
II. COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO MORALLY CONTROVERSIAL
BIOTECH SUBJECT MATTER
Patent law historically has been territorial in nature, with sov-
ereign states granting patents and providing means for patentees
to enforce their rights only within their borders.97 Consequently, if
a person wants to obtain patent protection for an invention in
multiple countries, she has to apply for a patent in each country of
383 U.S. 519 (1966), the Court, in dicta, quoted Justice Story's well-known statement and
essentially dismissed it, stating-
Justice Story's language sheds little light on our subject. Narrowly read, it does
no more than compel us to decide whether the invention in question is "frivolous
and insignificant"-a query no easier of application than the one built into the
statute. Read more broadly, so as to allow the patenting of any invention not
positively harmful to society, it places such a special meaning on the word
.useful" that we cannot accept it in the absence of evidence that Congress so
intended.
Id. at 533. Because the moral utility doctrine would place a special meaning on the word
"useful" that Congress has nowhere indicated, the Court would be unlikely to read such a
vague and nebulous requirement into the statute.
94. See Media Advisory, supra note 25.
95. See Juicy Whip, 185 F.3d at 1367.
96. See Fuller v. Berger, 120 F. 274, 275 (7th Cir. 1903).
97. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000) (remedy for infringement that occurs within the
United States); Margo A. Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional: The Geographical Limitation on
Prior Art in a Small World, 87 MINN. L. REv. 679, 729-30 (2003) (discussing efforts to
eliminate the territoriality of U.S. and foreign patent systems); Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial
Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 505, 520-21 (1997)
(discussing territoriality of U.S. patent law).
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interest" because the exclusionary rights provided do not extend
beyond the state's borders."
Morality-based controversies over the patenting of biotech
inventions are not limited to the United States; groups in several
countries have commissioned studies and drafted reports on the
ethical and moral issues associated with patenting certain biotech
inventions. 1°° The diversity of approaches used by countries and
regions to address these issues derive from and are shaped by
localized cultural norms and political structures. Nevertheless, a
comparison of approaches and results across jurisdictions may
illuminate common benefits and disadvantages that can inform U.S.
action in the future. A consideration of the vagaries of the current
U.S. approach provides a useful starting point for this analysis.
A. United States: Patent First, Ask Questions Later
In contrast to the patent laws of many other countries, U.S.
patent law contains no statutory basis for the USPTO or a court to
deny patent protection to morally controversial biotech subject
matter. The Patent Act of 1952 provides that a person is entitled to
a patent if her invention meets the statutory patentability require-
ments specified in the Act.1°" The burden is thus on the USPTO to
show that a person does not meet the statutory requirements.
Because the Act has no statutory morality inquiry, the United
States has a de facto system of patenting first, and asking questions
later with regard to morally controversial biotech subject matter. As
noted earlier, members of Congress seem unaware of the lack of
98. This is true except in places where a regional application system, such as the EPC,
exists. See discussion infra notes 220-23 and accompanying text.
99. GRAEmE B. DINWOODIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PATENT LAW 3
(2002).
100. See generally Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The Ethics ofPatenting DNA (2002) (UK);
The European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies to the European
Commission, Opinion on the Ethical Aspects of Patenting Inventions Involving Human Stem
Cells (Opinion No. 16 2002) (EU); Schrecker et al., Ethical Issues Associated with the
Patenting of Higher Life Forms (1997) (Canada) OTA, Patenting of Animals-Ethical
Considerations (2000) (USA).
101. Sections 101 and 102 express the entitlement concept: § 101 provides that"[wihoever
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter ... may obtain a patent therefor," and § 102 confirms that "a person shall be entitled
to a patent unless .... " 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-102 (2000) (emphasis added).
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subject matter limits in this system, but the lack of awareness
may be self-imposed to some extent, due to the politically sensitive
nature of the problem. As summed up by Senator Mark Hatfield:
"Public officials have too often preferred to allow such issues to be
decided by default in a vacuum of leadership.""° Congress has had
plenty of warning, as the examples below show, that the current
"patent first" order is problematic, but has failed to extrapolate from
those specific situations, e.g., proposals for a moratorium on animal
patents, to the general, e.g., the need to evaluate patent eligibility
before any patent issues, at least for morally controversial inven-
tions.
1. Lessons from Mice, Methods, Monsters, and "Mini Me"
Morally controversial biotech patents have issued from the
USPTO in increasing numbers since Diamond v. Chakrabarty flung
open the doors of the USPTO to biotech subject matter.'1s The moral
objections to patents in the following examples can be divided into
two groups: (1) objections to a patent based on concerns about the
morality of practicing the patent's underlying subject matter (multi-
cellular animals, human-animal chimera, and human cloning), or (2)
objections to a patent based on concerns regarding the morality of
allowing anyone to limit the practice of the patent's underlying
subject matter (medical process methods). These are very different
morality-based concerns yet both involve objections to the issuance
of a patent on the relevant subject matter. The following notable
examples illustrate the difficulties with having a "patent first,
ask questions later" approach to determining patent eligibility of
morally controversial biotech subject matter.
a. Multicellular Animals ('Mice")
On April 7, 1987, the USPTO made the announcement that it
considered "non-naturally occurring, non-human multicellular living
organisms, including animals, to be patentable subject matter"
102. Mark 0. Hatfield, From Microbe to Man, 1 ANIMAL L. 5, 5 (1995).
103. See supra notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
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based on Diamond v. Chakrabarty.' The USPTO issued the Notice
after its internal Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences had
held multicellular polyploidy oysters to be patent-eligible subject
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101."05 News of the Agency's plans to
patent animals created significant public controversy and calls for
bans on both the underlying research and patents on genetically
modified animals."°
Representatives of myriad constituencies testified regarding the
potential impacts, positive and negative, of such patents.1" Com-
mentators in favor of animal patents pointed to the potential for
curing human diseases, ending human hunger, and maintaining
U.S. dominance in biotechnology as reasons to continue awarding
such patents, as well as the fact that the USPTO's Notice explicitly
limited such patents to nonhuman organisms.' Arguments
supporting a ban or moratorium on animal patents included the
concern that such patents would encourage the development of
transgenic animals, devalue life and the dignity of life, disrupt
traditional family farms and the environment, and increase animal
104. 1077 O.G. 24 (April 21, 1987); see Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); Non-
Human Animals, supra note 25, at 664.
105. See Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425 (1987).
106. Legislation to halt or otherwise regulate animal patentingwas introduced in the 100th
and 101st sessions of Congress. See, e.g., H.R. 3247, 101st Cong. § 1 (1989); S. 2111, 100th
Cong. (1988); H.R. 3119, 100th Cong. § 2 (1987).
107. For arguments in favor of an animal patent moratorium, see, for example, Regulating
and Patenting Transgenic Animals: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties
and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 396,397-
98 (1987) [hereinafter Subcommittee Hearings] (statement of Rev. Wesley Granberg-
Michaelson, National Council of Churches); id. at 423-24 (statement of Margaret Mellon,
National Wildlife Federation). For arguments against a moratorium, see, for example, id. at
436-39 (statement of Geoffrey M. Karny, Dickstein, Shapiro & Morin).
108. Id. at 375 (statement of Leroy Walters, Ph.D.). Dr. Walters concluded his remarks
with the caveat that
sustained attention should be devoted to defining appropriate boundaries
between human and nonhuman organisms .... In the twenty-first century,
molecular biologists may have the capability of transferring not only individual
genes but also gene complexes ... across species lines. One hopes that timely,
calm, and systematic discussion of these technical possibilities will lead to a
social consensus on reasonable ethical limits to human curiosity and ingenuity.
Id. at 390. Unfortunately, such a "timely, calm, and systematic discussion" has not yet
occurred.
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suffering. °9 Theological arguments urging a moratorium included
this statement by Rabbi Michael Berenbaum:
To understand what must be done regarding the issue of animal
patenting, we must ask what constitutes life and what is merely
an inert manufactured commodity. So too we must ask what are
the limits of scientific knowledge and what are its frontiers.
Should there be constraints on scientific experimentation and/or
industrial exploitation of these experiments. And perhaps even
more importantly, who shall regulate, who shall decide?"1
Animal patent opponents also sought relief in court. Nine
plaintiffs, including the Animal Legal Defense Fund, the American
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, and the Humane
Farming Association, filed suit alleging that the USPTO Commis-
sioner had violated the Administrative Procedures Act in filing the
Notice without complying with the required public notice and
comment period."' In affirming dismissal of the suit for lack of
standing, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit noted:
Essentially, appellants assert a right, as members of the public
particularly interested in animals, to sue for what they perceive
to be an unwarranted interference with the discretionary judg-
ment of an examiner. However, it must be noted that whether
patents are allowable for animal life forms is not a matter of
discretion but of law.... Thus, if we assume examiners must
follow the Notice-which the Commissioner denies-such action
has no effect on the ultimate validity of any patent. Either the
subject matter falls within section 101 or it does not, and that
question does not turn on any discretion residing in examiners. "2
If members of Congress had been paying attention, the court's
words would have made clear the absence of any ability on the
part of the USPTO to deny patents on otherwise patentable sub-
ject matter, despite the reference to "non-human" organisms in the
109. See Rebecca Dresser, Ethical and Legal Issues in Patenting New Animal Life, 28
JURIMETRICSJ. 399, 410, 414-24 (1988).
110. Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 104, at 405 (statement of Rabbi Michael
Berenbaum, Scholar-in-Residence, Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism).
111. Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 923-24 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
112. Id. at 929-30 (emphasis added).
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Notice. USPTO pronouncements on the scope and limits of patent-
eligible subject matter are not determinative. Congress, with the
Supreme Court as ultimate interpreter, sets patent eligibility
limits. 113 Section 101 of the Patent Act,11' as interpreted,"l5 encom-
passes "anything under the sun that is made by man,""' including,
apparently, animals and even other men.
While Congress was in the process of hearing testimony on
the matter, the USPTO actually issued its first animal patent. On
April 12, 1988, almost a year to the day after its earlier dramatic
announcement, the USPTO heralded the issuance of the world's
first patent on a higher life form, in this case a mouse, as "a
singularly historic event."" 7 The mouse, developed by Harvard
researchers Philip Leder and Timothy Stewart, was genetically
modified to increase its chances of developing cancer, making it a
more useful research subject."' The patent's issuance further fueled
the controversy, but it also complicated the issue because a real
invention, with real potential for saving or improving human lives,
was at stake." 9 It is thus not surprising that bills that would have
created an animal patent moratorium failed to pass. Once the
patent engine begins to pick up speed, it can be very difficult to put
on the brakes.
113. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,315 (1980) (citing Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), for the proposition that it is 'the province ... of the judicial
department to say what the law is"); see also Exparte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. 443, 444 (1985).
114. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
115. See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intl, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 130-31 (2001);
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 181-83 (1981); Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308 (quoting United
States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178,199 (1933) as support of interpreting patent
laws broadly); id. at 315; Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 444.
116. S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952).
117. Schneider, supra note 43.
118. See U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (issued Apr. 12, 1988). The patent claims are not limited
to mice but include any nonhuman mammal. Id.
119. See Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 104, at 462-63 (statement of Dr. Alan Smith,
Vice President, Integrated Genetics) (testifying that during the hearings, a Washington Post
article reported on a new transgenic mouse developed to secrete a heart drug in its milk, in
such high concentrations that it could provide a vastly improved drug production method).
Id. at 468-70.
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b. Medical Procedures ("Methods")
Congress was able to put on the brakes, to an extent, several
years later when faced with a controversy over medical proce-
dure patents. In 1993, Dr. Samuel Pallin sued Dr. Jack Singer for
infringement of Pallin's patent covering a cataract surgery tech-
nique.120 Although Pallin's patent was not the first on a medical
procedure, it apparently was one of the first to be asserted against
a medical practitioner. 1 The lawsuit touched off a firestorm of
controversy concerning whether medical procedures should be
patentable. 2 Arguments against patents on medical procedures
focused on several moral and ethical concerns including: the impact
on patient access to life-saving techniques because of cost or a
physician's fear of suit;123 possible invasions of patient privacy in
the gathering of patent-related information;12' interference with
physician autonomy regarding patient treatment;' and disintegra-
tion of the traditional culture of disclosure and peer review that
pervades the medical community and enhances the overall quality
of patient care.'
This controversy differed from that over animal patents in a
very significant respect, one which clearly affected the legislative
outcome. Whereas with animal patents, the potential inventors in
120. Pallin v. Singer, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d 1050, 1051 (D. Vt. 1995).
121. See Thomas, supra note 12, at 1176-77; see also William D. Noonan, Patenting Medical
and Surgical Procedures, 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 651, 651-55 (1995) (describing
the history of patents for medical devices and techniques).
122. See, e.g., As Doctors Patent Medical Procedures, Patients Pay, USA TODAY, Jun. 19,
1995, at 10A (citing costs and privacy concerns associated with medical method patents and
advocating legislation to ban such patents); Lauran Neergaard, Move To Patent Surgical
Procedure Sparks Fight, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2,1995, at A14 (*[Dr. Pallin has sparked an uproar
by U.S. doctors who say patenting the way they practice medicine is unethical and drives up
health care costs. They've persuaded Congress to consider outlawing the practice."); Patently
Ridiculous, TULSA WORLD, Apr. 4, 1996, at A12 ("This case [Pallia v. Singer] demands a
decision in the public interest. Congress ought to act quickly to ban this type of patent.").
123. See Robert M. Portman, Legislative Restriction on Medical and Surgical Procedure
Patents Removes Impediment to Medical Progress, 4 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 91, 111 (1996)
(providing detailed arguments against medical procedure patents); Beata Gocyk-Farber, Note,
Patenting Medical Procedures: A Search for a Compromise Between Ethics and Economics, 18
CARDOZO L. REv. 1527, 1544-46 (1997) (describing briefly the possible impact of patents upon
medical costs).
124. Gocyk-Farber, supra note 123, at 1546-47.
125. Id. at 1547-48.
126. Id. at 1548-51.
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the biotech community were in favor of the patents,12 a large por-
tion of the potential inventors in the medical community, namely,
physicians, were against such patents.128 The House of Delegates of
the American Medical Association (AMA) voted to condemn efforts
to patent surgical and medical treatment methods in 19 9 4 ."2 The
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the AMA also issued a
report in 1995 condemning the patenting of medical procedures by
physicians as unethical. 0 The report concluded:
A physician has the ethical responsibility not only to learn from,
but also to contribute to, the total store of scientific knowledge
when possible. Physicians should strive to advance medical
science and make their advances known to patients, colleagues,
and the public. This obligation provides not merely incentive but
imperative to innovate and share the ensuing advances. The
patenting of medical procedures poses substantial risks to the
effective practice of medicine by limiting the availability of new
procedures to patients, and it should be condemned on this
basis. Accordingly, the ... Council ... believes that it is unethical
for physicians to seek, secure, or enforce patents on medical
procedures."'
Two bills were introduced in Congress to address the perceived
patent problem. One, preferred by the medical community, 3 2
prohibited the issuance of patents on medical and surgical proce-
dures.133 The other, which addressed the concerns raised by the
127. See Carl T. Hall, Biotech Industry Battles Move To Ban Patents, S.F. CHRON., May 16,
1995, at D1; Ronald Rosenberg, Call to Ban Gene Patents Stirs Industry Fears, BOSTON
GLOBE, May 19, 1995, at 39.
128. Physicians comprised the group of potential investors against these patents. See
Grocyk-Farber, supra note 123, at 1534.
129. Joel J. Garris, Note, The Case for Patenting Medical Procedures, 22 AM. J. L. & MED.
85, 86 (1996) (citing AMA Speaks Out on Managed Care, UPI, June 14, 1994, LEXIS, Nexis
Library, UPI File).
130. AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Ethical Issues in the Patenting of
Medical Procedures, reprinted in 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 341, 343-44 (1998).
131. Id. at 351.
132. Weldon E. Havins, Immunizing the Medical Practitioner "Process"Infringer: Greasing
the Squeaky Wheel, Good Public Policy, or What?, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 62,63-64 (1999);
Eric M. Lee, 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)-The Physician Immunity Statute, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'Y 701, 705 (1997).
133. H.R. 1127, 104th Cong. (1995).
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biotechnology industry,'0 only prevented medical procedure patents
from being asserted against medical professionals engaged in non-
commercial endeavors involving nonbiotechnology processes."
Congress chose the latter approach, which dealt with many, but
not all, of the concerns of the medical community. 3 6 The statute
eventually passed by Congress3 7 allows for the continued issuance
of medical procedure patents, but prohibits their enforcement
against doctors. 3
8
While Congress was able to put on the brakes in relation to
medical procedure patents, the compromise solution is problematic
and incomplete. Medical procedure patents that issued before
the effective date of the law are still enforceable against medical
practitioners.' 9 By not completely banning such patents, the statute
still leaves medical practitioners and others open to the possibility
of liability if faced with patent claims drafted to capitalize on the
complex language of the statute. Moreover, it has been argued that
the statute effects a government "taking" of property under the Fifth
Amendment,' 4° an issue that is much more likely to be implicated
under a "patent first" system.
c. Human-Animal Chimera ("Monsters")
The Newman-Rifkin chimera application mentioned in Part I and
pending in the USPTO is a "patent first, ask questions later"
problem in the making. Congress has expressed no view on the
patentability (or lack thereof) of human-animal chimera, thus the
USPTO has no basis (as long as the standard patentability criteria
134. Havins, supra note 132, at 66.
135. S. 2105, 104th Cong. (1996).
136. See Havins, supra note 132, at 69 (discussing some of the shortfalls of 35 U.S.C.
§ 287(c) with regard to the medical community).
137. See id. at 63-68 (summarizing the legislative history of 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)).
138. Under the statute, known as the Medical Activity Act, protection from suit does not
extend to the activities of persons engaged in other medical related activities such as "the
commercial development, manufacture, sale, importation, or distribution of a machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter or the provision of pharmacy or clinical laboratory
services." 35 U.S.C. § 287(cX3) (2000); Havins, supra note 132, at 69.
139. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(cX4); Havins, supra note 132, at 69.
140. See Brinckerhoff, supra note 35, at 177 (arguing that the new statute effected a Fifth
Amendment taking of property entitling patentees and patent applicants to government
compensation).
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are met)' for denying a patent on a seriously morally controversial
biotech invention."2 In dealing with the chimera application
discussed in Part I, the USPTO appears to have invoked not only
the now defunct moral utility requirement to reject the application
claims but also the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
1 43
The USPTO first alluded to a possible Thirteenth Amendment-
based rejection in its 1987 notice declaring "nonnaturally occurring,
non-human multicellular living organisms, including animals, to be
patentable subject matter within the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 101."'"
The notice stated that a claim to a human being would not be
considered patentable because "[t]he grant of a limited, but
exclusive property right in a human being is prohibited by the
Constitution," apparently referring to the Thirteenth Amendment."
Does the Thirteenth Amendment ban patents on humans? It is
not at all clear that the provision has anything to say about this.
The Thirteenth Amendment states that "In]either slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."'" But what
meaning does this language have in relation to patent law? A patent
does not give its owner the affirmative right to practice the subject
matter of the invention, but only the right to exclude others from
making, using, selling, or offering to sell the invention. 1 7 Thus a
hypothetical patent on a genetically modified "human" would not
entitle the patent owner to force the patented human to "do"
anything. 1"
141. See Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Panduit Corp., 475 U.S. 809,810-11 (1986); Roanwell Corp.
v. Plantronics, Inc., 429 U.S. 1004, 1008-09 (1976) (White, J., dissenting); United States v.
Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 48 (1966); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 12.19 (1966)
(discussing the context and evolution of standards for patentability).
142. Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Ex
parte Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. 801, 802 (Bd. App. 1977).
143. See Slater, supra note 16, at 7-8.
144. Non-Human Animals, supra note 25, at 664.
145. Id.
146. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
147. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
148. However, the patent could theoretically allow the patent owner to keep the patented
human from doing something: procreating, in essence 'making" the claimed invention. As
procreation is a fundamental, constitutionally protected right, the patent would be
unenforceable to the extent it conflicted with that right, but that would not, without more,
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The Newman-Rifkin application discloses a creature with a
mixture of human and animal genetic material.1 " Would that crea-
ture be "human" enough to be entitled to constitutional protection?
Neither Congress nor the courts have as yet made that determina-
tion. In the cloning context, researchers are currently interested in
harvesting stem cells from four to fourteen-day-old embryos. i 0 But
what if advances in science indicate better results from using four-
week or fourteen-week-old fetuses, for stem cells or some other
medically beneficial purpose? Roe v. Wade holds that at their ear-
liest stages of development, embryos are not constitutionally
protected as "persons." This holding suggests that, at a minimum,
the Thirteenth Amendment would not bar patents on embryos and
fetuses prior to viability.
15 1
Of course, Congress has the power to enact legislation banning
patents on human beings, however defined, pursuant to Article I,
section 8 of the U.S. Constitution.5 2 As several commentators have
noted, however, the USPTO or even a court may not have the
authority, absent congressional action, to invoke the Thirteenth
Amendment as a basis for denying a patent on subject matter
containing human genetic material. ls Numerous patents have
already issued on transgenic animals and animals being produced
for xenotransplantation that contain human genetic material.
154
This is not to say that the Thirteenth Amendment has no
applicability to patent law. Congress is empowered under the
remove a genetically modified human from patent subject-matter eligibility. See Russell H.
Walker, Note, Patent Law--Should Genetically Modified Human Beings Be Patentable?, 22
MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 101, 110 (1991) (surmising that "the Constitution would seem to prevent
enforcement of the 'making' clause of the patent infringement statutes against a human
parent").
149. U.S. Patent Application No. 10,308,135 (filed Dec. 18, 1997).
150. Committee on Pediatric Research and Committee on Bioethics, Human Embryo
Research, 108 PEDIATRICS 813, 813 (2001); E.D. Pellegrino, Balancing Science, Ethics and
Politics: Stem CellResearch, A Paradigm Case, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLY 591,593-94
(2002).
151. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158, 163-65 (1973).
152. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
153. See, e.g., Paul Lesko & Kevin Buckley, Attack of the Clones ... and the Issues of Clones,
3 COLUM. Sci. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 35 (2002); Magnani, supra note 42, at 459; Walker, supra
note 42, at 110.
154. Margaret A. Clark, This Little Piggy Went to Market: The Xenotransplantation and
Xenozoonose Debate, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 137, 137 (1999). See also infra notes 165-68 and
accompanying text.
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Amendment to identify and remedy badges and incidents of
slavery.'55 While patent rights are exclusionary, not affirmative,
in nature, a document evidencing "ownership" of a human being
which has the attributes of personal property could be sufficiently
akin to a "badge or incident of slavery" to trigger the protections of
the constitutional provision. Moreover, despite the Supreme Court's
historically narrow' 56 interpretations of the Thirteenth Amendment,
and even without explicit legislation enforcing it in this context, the
Court could determine sua sponte that a patent covering human
subject matter beyond the fetal viability stage should be barred, or
otherwise remediable, under the Thirteenth Amendment. 5 7 The
Amendment, however, is unlikely to have much impact beyond
situations where the patent subject matter is explicitly human and
past the stage of fetal viability.
Although the Newman-Riflkin application was filed to start a
debate,' the issuance of patents on human-animal chimera is
swiftly leaving the realm of the hypothetical and nearing reality.
The Newman-Rifkin HuMouse patent application, originally filed in
1997, was denigrated by scoffers and skeptics as unnecessary and
ill-conceived. 5 9 In just five short years, however, the activists' fears
have been confirmed as prescient: already, at least one similar
human animal chimera application is pending in the USPTO, filed
155. The Thirteenth Amendment provides that 'Congress shall have power to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation." U.S. CONST., amend. XIII, § 2; see also Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440 (1968) (noting that "Congress has the power under the
Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges and incidents of slavery,
and the authority to translate that determination into effective legislation*).
156. See, e.g., Baher Azmy, Unshackling the Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery and
a Reconstructed Civil Rights Agenda, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 1053-55 (2002).
157. Even without legislation, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388,395-97
(1971) could provide the basis for an action against the USPTO or, perhaps, even against a
patent owner. See Azmy, supra note 156, at 1053-54. The author states that:
Bivens thus supplies strong authority for the availability of a cause of action for
damages directly under the Thirteenth Amendment even in the absence of
congressional authorization. The Thirteenth Amendment, like the Fourth
Amendment, creates a substantive federal right.... If someone currently held in
a condition of slavery or involuntary servitude were to sue, that person would
assuredly be able to obtain the equitable remedy of an injunction releasing her
from servitude.
Id.
158. Aaron Zitner, Patently Provoking a Debate, L.A. TIMEs, May 12, 2002, at Al.
159. Joshua Ortega, Of Mice and Men: The Ethics of Chimerism, SEATrLE TIAES, Jan. 9,
2003, at B7.
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by researchers at the University of Massachusetts.'" Moreover, on
November 13,2002, at a forum organized by the New York Academy
of Sciences and Rockefeller University to discuss standards for
human embryonic stem cell research, scientists proposed injecting
human embryonic stem cells into mouse embryos which would then
be "reimplanted into a female mouse and allowed to develop." 6' The
reason given for the creation of such embryos was to test the human
stem cells for pluripotency, the ability to "integrate into the embryo
and contribute to the formation of every tissue, including the germ
line which produces sperm and eggs." 62 Although the forum did not
agree to support a document proposing the creation of such embryos,
researchers say experiments combining the cells of different species
in an embryo will likely become more common over time.' This
despite the fact that, as identified by one participant at the New
York forum, viable stem cell testing alternatives to making inter-
species chimera exist and these alternatives would not pose the
same moral and ethical concerns.' 6' Consequently, without legisla-
tive limits on the patent eligibility of morally controversial biotech
subject matter, we can expect to see human-animal chimera patents
of varying degrees of "humanness" issuing from the USPTO and
continuing to spur research of this sort.
d. Human Cloning ("Mini Me")
The diminutive clone "Mini Me" of Austin Powers fame (or
infamy)"6 may be fictional, but human cloning is fast becoming a
reality. A very recent biotech controversy centered on a cloning
160. See U.S Patent Application No. 09,828,876 (filed Sept. 22, 1997) (claiming a method
of producing a cloned chimeric mammalian embryo).
161. Dewitt, supra note 16, at 255 (emphasis added).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. (citing alternatives such as "assessing how the embryonic stem cells behave in
culture, or testing whether they can engraft and form different tissues after injection into
adult mice or mouse fetuses"). Of course, the use of human embryonic stem cells is morally
controversial in the first instance, and although the mentioned alternatives may be less
disturbing than the idea of human-animal chimera, they are still morally controversial in and
of themselves.
165. See Cloning Manual, Austin Powers.com, at httpJ/www.minime.com (last visited Dec.
5, 2003) (spoofing the cloning process as "mixing pure evil + parts ... cloned at 1/8th size ... Dr.
Evil's clone Mini Me").
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patent owned by the University of Missouri and claiming inventions
developed by two researchers from that school.'" U.S. Patent No.
6,211,429 (the '429 patent) was issued from the USPTO on April 3,
2001, but did not receive widespread attention until mid-2002.1
67
Although principally directed to techniques for producing human
organs from transgenic pigs for transplantation purposes, the
patent's scope is much broader.1" The patent claims, among other
things, methods for "producing a cloned mammal,""9 for "producing
a cloned mammalian embryo,"'7 ° and methods for transplanting
a nucleus from a cultured mammalian cell, mammalian embryo,
mammalian fetus, or adult mammal to a recipient mammalian
oocyte."'7 Most disturbing is the fact that the patent disclosure
states (but not in the claims) "the present invention encompasses
the living, cloned products produced by each of the methods
described herein." 72 Under U.S. law, that is actually a true state-
ment. Although there are no claims in the patent to any products of
the method, and the claims define the scope of the invention to
which patent rights attach, the University still has a patent-based
property interest in clones produced by the claimed methods. 173 The
property right is delineated in 35 U.S.C. § 271(g), which allows the
owner of a U.S. patent on a process of making a product to prevent
products made by the patented process from entering the United
States.'74 In other words, the '429 patent gives the University of
166. U.S. Patent No. 6,211,429 (issued Apr. 3,2001).
167. Justin Gillis, A New Call for Cloning Policy; Group Says Patent Would Apply to
Human Embryos, WASH. POST, May 17, 2002, at A12; Andrew Pollack, Debate on Human
Cloning Turns to Patents, N.Y. TnIm, May 17,2002, at A14.
168. See U.S. Patent No. 6,211,429 (issued Apr. 3, 2001).
169. Id. at 24.
170. Id. at 23.
171. Id. The patent document describes the claimed methods as being "generally applicable
to a wide array of unfertilized mammalian oocytes" including mouse, sheep, cow, horse, cat,
dog, and unfertilized human oocytes. Id.
172. 1& (emphasis added).
173. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 (2000); see also In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 959 (C.C.P.A.
1979).
174. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2000) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever without authority imports into the United States or offers to sell, sells,
or uses within the United States a product which is made by a process patented
in the United States shall be liable as an infringer, if the importation, offer to
sell, sale, or use of the product occurs during the term of such process patent. In
an action for infringement of a process patent, no remedy may be granted for
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Missouri the right to exclude clones made by the '429 patent from
being imported into this country for commercial purposes.'
As in other situations involving issuance of a patent on morally
controversial subject matter, the patent drew critical reaction,
negative commentary, and calls for legislative action from a vari-
ety of sources. 17  Senator Sam Brownback (D-Kan.) offered an
amendment to § 101 of the Patent Act adding a new subsection,
"Unpatentability of Human Organisms," that would exclude from
patent eligibility an organism of the human species at any stage of
development, produced by any method, a living organism made by
human cloning, or a process of human cloning.171
infringement on account of the noncommercial use or retail sale of a product
unless there is no adequate remedy under this title for infringement on account
of the importation or other use, offer to sell, or sale of that product.
Id.
175. Neither the mainstream media or members of Congress seem to be aware of the
importance or ramification of 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) for the '429 patent and the issue of patents
on humans. Interestingly, it previously was USPTO policy to reject claims to methods of
cloning humans. As an examiner stated in a 1999 Office Action rejecting mammalian cloning
claims: "methods of cloning humans are non-statutory as it is patent office policy not to issue
claims that are to or encompass humans (see 1077 OG 24, April 21, 1987)." Office Action, U.S.
Pat. Application No. 08,935,052, Mar. 28, 1999 (issued as U.S. Pat. No. 6,235,970). This
"policy" is not being uniformly followed, as several patents have issued from'the USPTO that
"encompass" humans by claiming mammals/animalasorganisms without a nonhuman
limitation in the claim itself. See, e.g., U.S. Patent Nos. 6,511,830 (issued Jan. 28, 2003),
6,485,910 (issued Nov. 26, 2002), 6,524,819 (issued Feb. 25, 2003), 6,284,456 (issued Sept. 4,
2001), and 6,420,149 (issued July 16, 2002). Special thanks to Dr. Peter DiMauor of the
International Center for Technology Assessment, for noting this departure from office practice
and providing me with a copy of the Office Action and relevant patent numbers.
176. See, e.g., Group Faults PTO for Issuing Patent on 'Method of Producing Cloned
Mammal", [May-Oct.] Pat. Trademark & Copyright J.(BNA) No. 1574, at 81-82 (May 24, 2002)
(discussing the Center for Technology Assessment's criticism of the PTO for issuing the
patent); Antonio Regalado, Patent on Human-Cloning Method Is Granted, Despite Current
Policy, WALL ST. J., May 16, 2002, at D3.
177. Senate Refuses To Attach Ban on Clone Patents to Terrorism Bill, (May-Oct.] Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1578, at 174-75 (June 21, 2002) [hereinafter Senate
Refuses Ban]. The proposed amendment defined "human cloning" as:
human asexual reproduction, accomplished by introducing nuclear material from
one or more human somatic cells into a fertilized or unfertilized oocyte whose
nuclear material has been removed or inactivated so as to produce a living
organism (at any stage of development) that is virtually identical to an existing
or previously existing human organism.
Id. Senator Brownback had tried previously to introduce a bill that would ban human embryo
cloning for research and reproductive purposes. Id.
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The amendment failed with lawmakers refusing to attach it to a
bill that ultimately became the "Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of
2002.178 In defending his action in offering the amendment, Senator
Brownback cited news reports on the '429 patent and referenced the
fact that three similar patents were pending in the USPTO. 17 9
In response, several senators derided Brownback's bill as
premature and unnecessary in view of the USPTO's 1987 policy
statement regarding the unpatentability of claims directed to or
including human beings.S° Brownback countered that lawyers were
challenging the USPTO policy and that legislative action was
needed "to provide clarity." Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) called the
amendment a "red herring" because the real debate, to his mind,
"has little to do with patents. It has to do with whether or not we
will allow important research to proceed."'81
Whether the Brownback amendment is good or bad is a matter
of policy for Congress to decide. Nevertheless, in making their
decision, the members of Congress who opposed Brownback's
amendment are laboring under at least two serious misapprehen-
sions. First, they believe the USPTO has the authority to deny
patents on morally controversial inventions, at least to the
extent they comprise humans."8 2 A new Brownback amendment
of November 17, 2003 confirms this misappropriation, as it is
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S5579 (daily ed. June 14, 2002) (statement of Sen. Edward
Kennedy) ("Of course we should reject the offensive idea that human beings could be patented,
as the Patent Office already rightly does. But the Brownback amendment goes far [beyond]
this commonsense proposal."); 148 CONG. REc. S5522 (daily ed. June 13, 2002) (statement of
Sen. Orrin Hatch) (calling the amendment"grossly premature"); 148 CONG. REC. S5519 (daily
ed. June 13,2002) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter) (noting that the USPTO's policy"renders
totally unnecessary the amendment that is being offered").
181. Senator Hatch also voiced concerns over the breadth of the bill and exactly what it
would cover, concluding that "[ilt is very dangerous for us to adopt such a measure without
appropriate hearings and a complete review of this matter." 148 CONG. REC. S5521-22 (daily
ed. June 13, 2002) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch). Although Senator Hatch is correct that
a full review and hearings are appropriate for legislation of this nature, unfortunately he did
not propose that the Senate actually hold any hearings or review of the matter.
182. Lawmtkers apparently are not the only ones with this misconception. See Dr. Jordan
J. Cohen, Letter Opposing Cloning Patents, Association of American Medical Colleges, at
http'/www.aamc.org/advocacy/library/research/corres/2002/061802.htm (June 18, 2002) (citing
the 1987 PTO policy and stating "[t]hus, the amendment offered by Senator Brownback is
superfluous").
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labelled, a "Clarification to the Law Against Patenting Human
Organisms.""m What members of Congress fail to realize is that the
USPTO "position" is neither the law, nor even the current practice
of the USPTO. Numerous patents on transgenic animals that
contain human genetic material exist already."8 4 The USPTO has no
authority to deny patents on morally controversial subject matter
that meets the statutory patentability requirements. 18
Second, these legislators underestimate the significance and im-
pact of granting U.S. patents on such inventions, in the presence or
absence of a research ban. Although the determination of whether
to allow the research to continue is a critically important issue, the
availability of a government imprimatur granting exclusive rights
over morally controversial inventions is a separate but important
issue, as well."8 6 As Senator Brownback succinctly summarized:
"This is about whether or not we as a government will allow a
person, a human in any stage or age of its development and growth
to be patented."'87
So if Congress has not yet spoken directly to the issue, and the
USPTO and courts have no say in the matter, then who gets to
decide what gets patented? The answer is biotech patent applicants,
also known as scientists or researchers.
2. Scientists: The Real Decision Makers
As discussed earlier, under the U.S. Patent Act, a person is en-
titled to a patent if he meets the statutory requirements.18 In the
183. Bar on "Human Organism" Patents Will Be Added to Senate Appropriations Bill, 67
Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1647, at 47-48 (Nov. 21, 2003). Members of
Congress, thus, clearly believe there is such a law to clarify! A similar amendment offered by
David Weldon (R-FL) in the House apparently was intended "to put on record that we support
the Patent Office in this position that human life in any form should not be patentable." Id.
What members of Congress fail to realize is that the USPTO 'position" is neither the law, nor
is it even the current practice of the USPTO.
184. See, e.g., U.S. Patent Nos. 6,518,482 (issued Feb. 11, 2003); 6,515,197 (issued Feb. 4,
2003); 6,509,515 (issued Jan. 21, 2003); 5,545,807 (issued Aug. 13, 1996); 4,736,866 (issued
Apr. 12, 1988).
185. Of course, the relevant patent applications must also meet other requirements, such
as the written description, enablement, and best mode provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
186. See discussion infra Part III.
187. See Senate Refuses Ban, supra note 177, at 174-75.
188. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
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absence of congressional action, researchers are essentially making
patent policy and determining the limits of patent eligibility by the
subject matter described in their applications. Professor Leon Kass
characterizes this situation as "a defect in the relation between
science and society" because:
The patent laws assume that innovations proposed by inventors
are ... simply good for the community at large. Instituted well
before many people recognized the communal price everyone
pays for certain kinds of technological change, they reflect a once
little questioned faith in progress. Thus, as they are instruments
for encouraging innovation, they are poorly designed for regu-
lating or controlling it. It is no surprise that the mechanism for
making the individual horses run turns out to be incapable of
slowing them down, should one later discover that, as a team,
they are in danger of running away with the rider."8 9
Are these the individuals that we, as a society, want to make these
important decisions? Are they the best actors, and is the closed
environment of the USPTO the best forum for these determinations?
This is unlikely to be the case. Dr. Robert Weinberg, winner of the
1997 National Medal of Science, member of the Whitehead Institute
for Biomedical Research and a biology professor at MIT, crystallized
the issue in a recent article on therapeutic cloning:
[Nione of us needs a degree in bioethics to find the bottom line
in the arguments. They all ultimately converge on a single
question: When does human life begin? Some say it is when
sperm and egg meet, others when the embryo implants in the
womb, others when the fetus quickens, and yet others when the
fetus can survive outside the womb. This is a question that we
scientists are neither more nor less equipped to decide than the
average man or woman in the street, than a senator from Kansas
or a cardinal in Cologne. "0
Although scientists may not be better equipped than anyone else
to determine when life begins, they are certainly far less equipped
189. Leon R. Kass, Patenting Life, CommENT 45-50 (Dec. 1981).
190. Robert A. Weinberg, Of Clones and Clowns, ATLAN'c MONTBLY, June 2002, at 54, 59
(emphasis added).
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than Congress to determine what the limits of patent eligible
subject matter should be. Unlike Congress, scientists hold no public
hearings, they are not accountable to any public constituency, and
they have a cloak of relative anonymity to shield them from public
view. This is not to say scientists and researchers are bad people, or
enemies of the public, or any such thing.19' Rather, the interests and
goals of individual researchers should not be substituted for, nor
denominated as, the interests of society at large. As Drs. Maureen
and Samuel Condic explain:
At their cores, scientists are motivated by curiosity .... There are
no necessary limits to scientific curiosity-not even the limits of
decency .... The infamous experiments of Milgram or the
Tuskegee Syphilis study ... are the kind of science some may
elect to pursue if left with only "scientific curiosity" as a guide.
Endorsing [via a patent] scientific research simply because it is
interesting and it might prove useful is a dangerous path....
Much "useful" information can be derived from experiments that
are objectively evil. The ends, no matter how noble, cannot
justify any and all possible means. The challenge to society is:
How will the line be drawn, and by whom? By virtue of their
disposition and their focus on "the possible," scientists are not
particularly well-suited to make such prudential judgments. 92
Patent applications covering morally controversial biotech subject
matter are not filing themselves in the USPTO; they are created by
scientists, with the help of patent attorneys. These scientists may
indeed have as a goal curing some dreaded disease, and the lure of
patent protection may provide necessary funds for that research. If
one takes the view that as long as an invention is related to the goal
of alleviating human suffering, the government should grant patent
rights on it, moral concerns notwithstanding, the result may soon
be, among other things, patents on human fetuses that are geneti-
191. The author, herself a former scientific researcher and co-inventor on a patented
invention, sincerely intends no disrespect or denigration to scientists and other patent
applicants. Certainly scientists can "also be profoundly interested and thoughtful about
ethids." Marilynn Manchione, Ethical, Legal Questions Hardly Sway Scientist at Vanguard
of Human Cloning, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 5,2002, at 1A (quoting ACT CEO Michael
West). This Article is simply highlighting the flaws in an approach that allows patent
applicants to set patent policy for the country.
192. Condic & Condic, supra note 16, at 167-68.
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cally modified in ways one can only imagine. Patent protection could
convert such fetuses, to the extent they are denied constitutional
protection, into justifiable commodities, supplying life-saving tissue
and organs to sick children and adults.' 3
Is relieving human suffering the supreme imperative that trumps
all other values? Right now, in the realm of patents, it appears to be,
with no consideration of whether patents on morally controversial
biotech subject matter are a "strategic necessity" or even a moral
necessity.94 Many scientists clearly do not know where to draw the
line, or whether there should even be a line addressing what
"means" are morally unacceptable, even for achieving a moral "end."
According to Drs. Maureen and Samuel Condic, this should not be
surprising because:
When it comes to morals, the key insight to remember is that
scientific research is about the possible, not about the ethical or
the good. As such, scientific evidence can inform society whether
something can, at this point in time, be done and ... can predict
whether it is probable something will be done in the future, but
science is inherently silent on the topic of whether it should be
done. In other words, a scientist, qua scientist is no better
equipped to weigh-in on the moral implications of some new
technology by virtue of his scientific training than is any other
person. Indeed, scientists are, in many respects, uniquely un-
suited to make moral [judgments-precisely due to their focus on
the possible. Much that is "possible," and a legitimate topic of
investigation, from the perspective of science, is nonetheless
objectively evil. 9 '
It is thus not even realistic to expect patent applicants to set
limits on the moral aspects of patent subject-matter eligibility.
Nevertheless, if scientists cannot set such limits, Congress, as the
193. This is a classic slippery slope argument, but one that seems quite valid in light of the
progression in biotech patenting towards more human-derived products and life forms and the
almost visible public desensitization to patents on higher life forms that has occurred since
the patenting of the Harvard oncomouse in 1987. See Volokh, supra note 35, at 1079
(discussing a variety of slippery slope mechanisms and the real risks such slippage poses).
194. See Meilander, supra note 16, at 12 (discussing moral arguments for continuing stem
cell research).
195. Condic & Condic, supra note 16, at 161-62.
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representative of the people, must set limits on patent rights over
morally controversial means to morally desirable ends.
A popular argument among commentators in this area is that
patents are not the issue: the underlying research is the issue and
a focus on patents is simply a bothersome distraction."9 This fallacy
has helped propel the United States to the edge of the precipice it
arguably is now sliding down. The Chakrabarty decision was
critically important because of the signal it sent to researchers and
investors that "there's gold in them thar hills!," the "hills" of bio-
technological advancement protected by patent rights to monopolize
profits. 9 ' As Professor Burk succinctly notes: "[Oipposition to
patenting cannot be viewed as irrational: offering a financial
incentive such as a patent will directly or indirectly increase the
activity that is of true concern to patenting opponents."'9 The fact
is, altruistic scientists currently are not banned from conducting
research on morally controversial biotech subject matter, but
without the promise of lucrative licensing contracts and royalties
made available as a result of government granted patent protec-
tion, much of the research likely would not continue.' Moreover,
because diseases still must be cured, some researchers would be
more likely to focus their efforts on less morally controversial
solutions; for example, working with adult stem cells as opposed to
embryonic stems cells, because patents would be freely available for
196. See, e.g., Group Faults PTO, supra note 8, at 81; Ho, supra note 83, at 248; Amanda
Warren, A Mouse in Sheep's Clothing: The Challenge to the Patent Morality Criterion Posed
by "Dolly," 20 EuR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 445, 447 (1998).
197. See, e.g., ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 47, at 156 ("Chakrabarty was a clear signal,
however, [that patenting was broadly available in the biotechnology field, and it] opened the
coffers of Wall Street to the biotechnology industry.") (internal citations omitted); Carol
Grunewald, Monsters of the Brave New World, NEw INTERNATIONALIST, Jan. 1991, at 22, 23,
available at http:l/www.newint.org/issue2l5hnonsters.htm:
mwo historic events spurred the growth in what is now referred to as the
"biotech industry." In 1980 the US Supreme Court ruled ... that "man-made"
micro-organisms can be patented. Then in April 1987, without anypublic debate,
the US Patent OfficeU suddenly announced that all forms of life-including
animals but excluding human beings-may be considered "human inventions."
Id.
198. Dan L. Burk, Patenting Transgenic Human Embryos: A Nonuse Cost Perspective, 30
Hous. L. REv. 1597, 1668-69 (1993).
199. Id. at 1667 (noting that the lure of pecuniary gain traditionally has not been the
motivating factor for scientists, but a shift has occurred, confined largely to the biotech area).
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such inventions.2 "3 Conversely, the availability of patents on morally
controversial biotech subject matter provides a strong motivation for
interested parties to lobby Congress and inhibit or overturn funding
or research bans.
This dichotomy, placing a ban on research but allowing the
issuance of patents on the fruits of the research, can be analogized
to what Professor Eugene Volokh calls a "political power" slippery
slope.20 1 If Congress allows the issuance of morally controversial
biotech patents but bans certain types of morally controversial
biotech research, owners of patents that could be practiced if the
bans were lifted would have a strong incentive to lobby Congress.'
Thus allowing the issuance of morally controversial patents could:
change the balance of political power"by empowering an interest
group that might use this power to promote B [e.g., freedom to
research/commercialize inventions]; getting to A [e.g., patents]
first and then to B [freedom to research/commercialize] would
thus be politically easier than getting to B [freedom to re-
search/commercialize] directly.0
Because patents already issue first in the United States, such
interest groups will generally be at an advantage in relation to
Congress. The fact that patents were issued on embryonic stem cells
and methods of mammalian cloning before Congress was in a
position to study the issues has no doubt affected Congress' ability
to pass legislation banning such research.
Although senators and scientists refuse to credit the idea of
patents on humans, the above mentioned cloning patent that has
200. See Meilander, supra note 16, at 12; see also Gary Elijah Dann, New Use for Embryos
Is Disturbing, THE RECORD, Mar. 5,2002, at A7:
A recent study carried out by researchers at New York University ... Yale
University ... and John Hopkins School of Medicine has shown reason to believe
that an adult stem cell in the bone marrow can transform itself into almost any
organ in the body.... Why, then, insist on engaging in morally thin research
when more time and research may very well make the use of human embryos
unnecessary.
Id.
201. Volokh, supra note 36, at 1114-21.
202. As, of course, would people who otherwise might benefit from the products or
therapies that commercialization of the patented inventions would ostensibly provide. See idt
at 1115.
203. Id.
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already issued, as well as the pending University of Massachusetts
chimera patent application, provides clear proof of where research-
ers are headed. The University of Missouri patent sought ownership
of the "living, cloned products produced by each of the methods
described herein."2°4 The owners of the patent claim to have no
interest in cloning humans, let alone owning humans. If that is the
case, why assert ownership? Such research is headed toward full
commoditization of human beings, made possible and encouraged by
patent protection. 2°5 As one commentator noted:
[Iln just the last year we have seen how quickly moral lines
dissolve in the face of promised medical progress. We have seen
how the need to use only embryos "left over" from in vitro
fertilization (which are going to die anyway, advocates said) has
become the need to create cloned embryos explicitly for research
and destruction. And we can imagine how the need for cloned
embryos will soon become the need for later-term cloned
fetuses-something these patents anticipate and endorse. 2'
Such comments should not be lightly dismissed as overly dramatic
hyperbole. The University of Massachusetts chimera application
claims a mammalian fetus created by a claimed cloning method.'
According to the Supreme Court, determining the moral limits of
patent subject matter eligibility "is a matter of high policy for
resolution within the legislative process after the kind of investiga-
tion, examination, and study that legislative bodies can provide
and courts cannot."2w Yet, Congress, probably unintentionally, has
placed patent applicants in the position of de facto arbiters of
patent eligibility.2 9 This is not a situation in which we can say that
inaction by Congress indicates its approval of patent subject matter
204. U.S. Patent No. 6,211,429 (issued Apr, 3,2001).
205. See Grunewald, supra note 16. ("[WMe must remember that the mind that views
animals as pieces of coded genetic information to be manipulated and exploited at will is the
mind that would view human beings in a similar way.*).
206. Krystol, supra note 16. The article also mentions a pending patent application filed
by researchers from Massachusetts that would allow them to "'use tissues derived from
[cloned] embryos, fetuses or offspring, including human and ungulate tissues,' and to own the
patent rights to the 'progeny of the (cloned] offspring." Id. (citation omitted).
207. See U.S. Patent Application No. 09,828,876 (filed Apr. 10, 2001).
208. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980).
209. Senate Refuses Ban, supra note 177, at 174.
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being unlimited by morality concerns.21 ° The fact that some
Senators believe (1) that "appropriate hearings and a complete
review of this matter"2" is necessary, (2) that "we should reject the
offensive idea that human beings could be patented,"212 (3) that the
"law against" patenting humans needs to be clarified,"3 and (4) that
the USPTO has the authority to deny patents on humans,21 makes
it clear that Congress has yet to speak definitively on this issue.
Because patents issue first, Congress and the public are continu-
ally in a reactive, rather than proactive, mode.215 The grant of a
patent also covers the subject matter with a veneer of legitimacy
and a presumption of validity that can be difficult to overcome.216
Patents on biotech inventions are generally hyped as necessary,
both for realizing the great promise for alleviating human suffering
the invention offers, and for keeping the United States at the
forefront of cutting edge, lucrative research.1 7
Furthermore, even if Congress enacts legislation to disallow
patents on certain subject matter after a controversial patent has
issued, the legislation is unlikely to be retroactive to invalidate the
issued patent or patents.21' As described by Professor Polly Price:
210. Cf Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 629 n.7 (1987)
("Congress has not amended the statute to reject our construction, nor have any such
amendments even been proposed, and we therefore may assume that our interpretation was
correct."); BobJones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,601 (1983) ("In view of its prolonged
and acute awareness of so important an issue, Congress' failure to act on the bills proposed
on this subject provides added support for concluding that Congress acquiesced in the IRS
rulings of 1970 and 1971.").
211. 148 CONG. REC. S5522 (daily ed. June 13, 2002) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
212. 148 CONG. REC. S5579 (daily ed. June 14, 2002) (statement of Sen. Ted Kennedy).
213. See supra Part II.A.1.d.
214. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
215. As Professor Kass notes:
[In practice, the patent law threatens to tip the scale in favor of runaway
change. Increasingly encouraged, the horses of technological progress break into
full gallop, seemingly out of any one's control, and the community is left with the
difficult task of adjusting after the fact to the paths traveled and the changes
wrought.
Kass, supra note 189, at 49.
216. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000).
217. See, e.g., Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 104, at 437-56 (statement of Geoffrey
M. Karny).
218. An example of this is the Medical Activity Act, which only applied to patents issued
after the effective date of the Act. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2000).
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[AlIthough Congress is not required to create intellectual
property rights at all, once it has done so there may be some
constitutional constraint upon retroactive modifications to those
rights.... The Supreme Court has long recognized that the
federal government, as well as the states, ought not change
expectations retroactively, particularly to impair previously
conferred benefits supported by investment-backed expect-
ations." 9
Such concerns about legislation implicating takings consider-
ations further frustrates Congress' ability to make the necessary
inquiry into whether the morally controversial "means" to the
desirable "ends" are appropriate subjects for patent protection-an
inquiry that is exceedingly difficult to undertake ex post. Perhaps
a different order of inquiry, for example, patent eligibility before
patentability, would be preferable?
B. Europe, Canada, and Beyond: Ask Questions First, Then Patent
The territorial model of patent rights is still in effect, but it is
slowly changing. Various treaties designed to streamline the process
of multi-country patent application filings and reduce associated
costs are in place and more are in development.220 Several regional
treaties already exist that allow an applicant to file one application
with a central office and obtain patent protection in multiple
countries, although the patent must be enforced in cases of infringe-
ment in each individual country.2 The most significant regional
treaty is the Convention on the Grant of European Patents (EPC),
signed in 1973 by a group of countries seeking to create a uniform
219. PRICE, supra note 35, at 141-42.
220. See, e.g., Patent Law Treaty, June 1, 2000, World Intellectual Property Organization,
available at http'Avww.wipo.int/clea/docs/enwotwo038en.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2001)
[hereinafter PLT]; Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645 [hereinafter
PCT]; Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, reprinted in
SELECTED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND UNFAIR COMPETITION STATUrES, REGULATIONS AND
TREATIES 950 (Roger E. Schecter ed., 2001); see also Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Vivian S. Kuo,
World Patent System Circa 20XX AD., 38 IDEA 529 (1998) (discussing treaties).
221. European Patent Convention (July 2002), available at http//www.european-patent-
office.org/epdpdfe.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2003) [hereinafter EPC]; Eurasian Patent
Convention, available at httpA/www.eapo.org/eng/documents/kovenci.html (last visited Aug.
30, 2003).
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European patent system.2" The EPC, which currently has twenty-
seven contracting members and four extension states,22 established
the European Patent Office (EPO) and contains substantive and
procedural requirements for obtaining a European patent, valid in
all member countries with only a single application. 22' An applicant
may still apply for patent protection in each individual member
country, but the laws of each country have been modified to comply
with the EPC.2 s
In contrast to the U.S. "patent first" approach, the EPC (cover-
ing all European Union states plus others) contains an express
morality-based patent eligibility bar. EPC Article 53 states:
"European patents shall not be granted in respect of: (a) Inventions
the publication or exploitation of which would be contrary to 'ordre
public' or morality .... 1226 Article 53(a) provides not only a basis for
EPO examiners to reject a patent application, but also provides that
any member of the public can lodge an opposition to the grant of a
222. See, e.g., European Patent Office, The European Patent Office, at http'/www.european-
patent-office.orgepo/pubs/brochuregeneral/eepoegeneral.htm (last modified May 20, 2003).
The EPC went into effect in 1977. Id.
223. European Patent Office, EPO Member States, at http/www.european-patent-
office.org/epo/members.htm (last modified Sept. 25, 2003). Current contracting states are:
Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United
Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Portugal,
Sweden, Turkey, Republic of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Republic of Estonia, Hungary,
Republic of Romania, Slovenia, and the Slovak Republic. Current extension states are:
Albania, Lithuania, Latvia, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Membership
in the organization is not limited to European Union (EU) countries although all EU countries
are members. "Extension states" are expected to become members in due course and patent
applicants can currently designate them on a European patent application.
224. European Patent Office, The European Patent, at http-/www.european-patent-
offic.org/grindex-htm (last modified May 30, 2001). The European patent is treated as a
national patent in each member country. Applicants can still seek patent protection in
individual EPC member countries exclusively or concurrently, however, only one patent
(national or European) will ultimately be maintained. The laws of all member states must be
in harmony with the EPC so that those laws do not geographically limit sources of prior art
either. Unfortunately, there is no central means for enforcing a European patent. A patentee
must still (in most circumstances) bring suit in each country where the patent is being
infringed. Efforts are underway to create a community patent that would be a "true"
European patent, enforceable in a single court with community-wide effect. See Proposal for
a Council Regulation on the Community Patent (Presented by the Commission of the European
Communitities), Jan. 8, 2000, at http'/europa.eu.int/eur-lexten/com/pdf/2000/en.500PC0412.
pdf.
225. See DINWOODIE ET AL. supra note 99, at 621.
226. EPC, supra note 221, at art. 53(a).
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patent on this or any other patentability basis, at any time within
nine months of the publication of the EPO decision to issue the
patent.22 7 Over the past two decades, the EPO has been called on
several times to determine if inventions should be denied patent
protection based on morality concerns, and its decisions evidence
both benefits and challenges in employing a statutory morality
provision.
1. Balancing Interests, Unacceptability, and Public Abhorrence
The first EPO decision to apply the morality limitation of EPC
Article 53 dealt with the famous Harvard oncomouse. In addition to
filing an application in the USPTO which issued as a patent in
1988, the inventors also filed applications on the mouse in the EPO
and Canada.2" The Examining Division of the EPO originally re-
jected the application based on a conclusion that the application was
directed to nonpatentable subject matter and contained an insuffi-
cient disclosure.229 The EPO Technical Board of Appeal reversed and
remanded the application instructing the Examining Division to
consider, among other things, whether the ordrepublic and morality
provisions of Article 53(a) were a bar to patenting the invention. 230
In considering the application of Article 53(a) to the invention,
the Examining Division chose a very narrow focus for its inquiry,
ignoring any objections to patents on animals in principle. 23 1
Instead, the Examining Division employed a balancing test, noting
227. Id. art. 99. The United States has no comparable postgrant proceeding allowing for
public intervention in the issuance of a patent. Moreover, as established by the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, members of the public
also lack standing to challenge the validity of a patent in court. 932 F.2d 920, 924 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
228. See European Patent No. EP-B1696000072 (issued May 13, 1992); Harvard Coll. v.
Canada (Commissioner of Patents), discussed infra notes 269-81 and accompanying text.
229. T19/90, Harvard/Onco-mouse, [1990] E.P.O.R. 501 (Technical Board of Appeal 3.3.2
Oct. 3, 1990), reprinted in Edward Armitage, Updating the European Patent Convention, 22
IIC 73, 74-84 (1991) (citing In re President and Fellows of Harvard College, Examining
Division of the European Patent Office, OJ EPO 1989, 451 [20 IIC 889 (1989)1).
230. Id. at 81-82.
231. Id. at 81. The Technical Board of Appeal noted that Article 52(1) of the EPC contains
a "general rule ... that European patents should be granted' subject only to express
exclusionary provisions such as Article 53(a) and that such exclusions were to be interpreted
narrowly. Id.
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that "[flor each individual invention [involving higher life forms] the
question of morality has to be examined and possible detrimental
effects and risks have to be weighed and balanced against the
merits and advantages aimed at." 2 The Examining Division
then set about balancing three state interests: (1) the interest in
remedying human diseases, (2) the interest in protecting the
environment from the uncontrolled spread of unwanted genes, and
(3) the interest in avoiding cruelty to animals.
On the first interest, remedying human diseases, the Examining
Division came down on the side of patentability, noting that the
invention could be of great benefit to mankind if it could help in the
search for a cure for cancer, one of the most frequent causes of
human death.233 For the second interest, protection of the environ-
ment, the Examining Division admitted that the introduction of
such genetically modified animals into the environment, where
malignant foreign genes could be spread through mating, could
cause unforeseen environmental problems. The Examining Division,
however, did not consider this concern to be a significant bar to a
patent since the animals would be used solely in laboratory settings
and would not be released into the general environment.24 Finally,
the third interest, preventing cruelty to animals, was also deter-
mined by the Examining Division to not be a bar to a patent. The
Examining Division reasoned that although more of the animals
with the foreign gene would develop painful cancers, the invention
allowed for the use of fewer animals in total so the invention would
in effect reduce the overall extent of animal suffering.235 The
absence of suitable alternatives was also relevant to the Examining
Division's decision, which noted that animal models currently are
considered indispensable in testing.3 6 In allowing a patent on the
invention to issue, the Examining Division concluded:
In the overall balance ... the present invention cannot be
considered immoral or contrary to public order. The provision of
a type of test animal useful in cancer research and giving rise to
232. Harvard/Onco-mouse, 1990 E.P.O.R. 501, 527.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
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a reduction in the amount of testing on animals .. can generally
be regarded as beneficial to mankind. A patent should therefore
not be denied [based on] Article 53(a) EPC. 7
Although the balancing test provides an example of "asking
questions first, patenting later," it is a far from perfect approach.
One problem with the test is that the Examining Division never
defined morality nor stated a basis (other than instructions from the
Technical Board) for choosing those particular factors to balance as
opposed to other possible concerns. For example, one objection to the
patent during opposition proceedings was that "the Examining
Division failed to consider the morality of every possible application
of the patent which was being claimed.""3 The objection cited an
"oncogiraffe" as a creature that would come within the literal terms
of the claims, but would be highly unlikely to be used as a test
model in cancer research, thus shifting the balance (in view of
animal welfare considerations) against a patent.239
Moreover, the decision of the EPO did not vanquish controversy
regarding the mouse patent. Even though the patent issued, it
quickly became the target of more than a dozen petitions to the
EPO opposing its issuance.2 Nevertheless, the test does provide
the EPO with a mechanism for evaluating the patent eligibility of
morally controversial biotech inventions before granting a patent.
For example, a different transgenic animal, one genetically modified
to lose its hair so that it would be useful in human baldness studies,
apparently failed the balancing test according to a notice from
the EPO to the Upjohn Corporation, the owner of the mouse
application.2"" Although the degree of animal suffering would be
similar, the interest in curing baldness is certainly not as compel-
ling as the interest in curing cancer.
237. Id.
238. Warren, supra note 196, at 447 (citing Alison Abbott, Oncomouse Hearing Ends Up
in Confusion, 378 NATURE 427, 427 (1995)).
239. Id.
240. See Hans-Rainer Jaenichen & Andreas Schrell, The "Harvard Onco-mouse' in the
Opposition Proceedings Before the European Patent Office, 15 EuR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 345
(1993).
241. See, e.g., Robin Nott, The Biotech Directive: Does Europe Need a New Draft?, 17 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REv. 563, 565-66 (1995); Steve Conner, Patent Ban on Baldness "Cure" Mouse,
INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 2, 1992, at 5.
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Balancing competing interests is not the only approach the
EPO has taken when evaluating the applicability of the Article
53(a) exception. In two later cases, different bodies within the EPO
articulated two additional morality tests: (1) the unacceptability
test242 and (2) the public abhorrence test.2"
A few years after the Oncomouse case, the EPO was confronted
again with applying Article 53(a) in Greenpeace v. Plant Genetic
Systems.2" Greenpeace asserted Article 53(a) during an opposition
as a basis for revoking a patent on transgenic plants developed to be
resistant to a particular class of herbicides. Greenpeace lost the
opposition and appealed to the EPO Technical Board of Appeal (the
Board) which maintained the patent, albeit in an amended form,
concluding that the invention did not contravene the ordre public
or morality requirements of Article 53(a).2" In framing the nature
of the morality inquiry under Article 53(a), the Board looked to
the intent of the drafters of the EPC, as evidenced by historical
documents, and explained:
The concept of morality is related to the belief that some
behaviour is right and acceptable whereas other behaviour is
wrong, this belief being founded on the totality of the accepted
norms which are deeply rooted in a particular culture. For the
purposes of the EPC, the culture in question is ... European
society and civili[z]ation. Accordingly, under Article 53(a) EPC,
inventions the exploitation of which is not in conformity with the
conventionally-accepted standards of conduct pertaining to this
culture are to be excluded from patentability as being contrary
to morality."
The Board concluded that none of the claims in the patent
violated the morality provision of Article 53(a) because they
concerned "activities (production of plants and seeds, protection of
plants from weeds or fungal diseases) and products (plant cells,
242. T356/93, Greenpeace v. Plant Genetic Sys., [19951 E.P.O.R. 357, 373, (Tech. Bd. App.
1995).
243. Howard Florey/Relaxin, Application No. 83307553.4, [19951 E.P.O.R. 541 (Opposition
Div. 1994); T0320/87, Lubrizol Hybrid Plants, [1988] E.P.O.R. 173 (Tech. Bd. App. 1988).
244. [19951 E.P.O.R. 357, 373 (Tech Bd. App. 1995).
245. Id. at 374.
246. Id. at 366 (emphasis added).
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plants, seeds) which cannot be considered to be wrong as such in the
light of conventionally accepted standards of conduct of European
culture.""7 In other words, the Board ignored the more fundamental
concerns regarding the patent's subject matter and focused narrowly
on the general types of products and activities the patent concerned.
This narrow focus vallowed the Board to avoid broader concerns
and tied patentability to the "public acceptability" of the general
categories of patentable subject matter.48
Greenpeace had submitted both surveys and opinion polls
conducted among farmers and the general public showing opposition
to patents on plants and animals and genetic engineering generally
as a way of establishing that such patents were contrary to the
norms of European society. The Board dismissed the surveys and
polls noting that such results can fluctuate within a short time
period, can be easily influenced and controlled based on the type of
questions asked, and do not necessarily reflect deeply rooted moral
norms. Most importantly, because the applicability of Article 53(a)
must be determined on a case-by-case basis, such polls would have
to be made "ad hoc on the basis of specific questions in relation to
the particular subject matter claimed."249
In reaching its decision, the Board expressly declined to employ
the balancing test used in the Oncomouse decision, noting that it
"[was] not the only way of assessing patentability" under Article
53(a) but was "just one possible way, perhaps useful in situations in
which an actual damage [e.g., suffering of animals] ... exists."' The
Board held that the balancing test could not be used, because
sufficient evidence of actual disadvantages was not adduced in the
case."1 This "unacceptability" standard is certainly a lower hurdle
for an invention to overcome than the balancing test, because
balancing does not even come into play unless concrete societal
disadvantages of the invention are presented.
The third test for patentability under Article 53(a), public ab-
horrence, has been cited in several EPO decisions, sometimes in
247. Id. at 370.
248. The Board cited their narrow focus as in keeping with principles of construing
exceptions to patentability narrowly. Id. at 366, 370.
249. Id. at 369.
250. Id. at 373.
251. Id.
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combination with the unacceptability test.252 In Howard Flo-
rey /Relaxin v. Fraktion der Griinen im Europaischen Parlament,
several groups filed an opposition in the EPO to the issuance of a
patent on the hormone Relaxin.25 They argued that the patent
would offend Article 53(a) because, among other things, it covered
the patenting of human genes and involved taking tissue from a
pregnant woman, thus offending human dignity.254 The EPO Board
disagreed and articulated the "public abhorrence" test for exclusion
under Article 53(a):
A fair test to apply is to consider whether it is probable that the
public in general would regard the invention as so abhorrent
that the grant of patent rights would be inconceivable. If it is
clear that this is the case, objection should be raised under
Article 53(a); otherwise not.2"
The "public abhorrence" test thus presents an even lower hurdle
for a morally controversial invention to overcome since fewer in-
ventions are likely to be deemed "abhorrent" to society than simply
"unacceptable" to society.
This confusing and largely unsatisfactory panoply of tests to
interpret the meaning and applicability of the morality proviso of
Article 53(a) added a further impetus for European Union-wide
legislation that would clarify and delineate the specific patentable
limits of morally controversial biotech subject matter. The result
was the European Union Biotechnology Directive of 1998.
2. The Biotech Directive: Earnestly Inconsistent
The EPO's lack of success in applying the EPC morality exception
illustrates some of the difficulties that are likely to attend any effort
to articulate an acceptable morality standard for patentable subject
252. See id. (employing the unacceptability test as the basis for the Board's decision, but
also citing the public abhorrence test); see also Donna M. Gitter, Led Astray by the Moral
Compass: Incorporating Morality into European Union Biotechnology Patent Law, 19
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, 22-26 (2001) (discussing cases).
253. Howard Florey/Relaxin, App. No. 83307553.4, (1995] E.P.O.R. 541, 544 (Opposition
Div. 1994).
254. Id. at 549.
255. Id. at 550.
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matter. Such difficulties, however, did not keep the EU from at-
tempting the task with the European Union Biotechnology Directive
(the Directive). In drafting the Directive, the European Parliament
and Council had two primary goals. The first was to clarify and
harmonize the legal protection of biotech inventions in the region to
increase investment in biotechnology research.5 6 For years the
European Union (EU) has lagged behind the United States and
Japan in biotechnology, a deficit attributed to deficient, confusing,
and overlapping patent rights.257 The second goal was to preserve
the right of EU member states to consider moral implications in
determining patent-eligible subject matter, as they were able to do
under EPC Article 53(a).258
To accomplish these goals, the drafters of the Directive traversed
a political tightrope, specifying a variety of biotech inventions that
were eligible for patent protection, and ones that were not, to serve
as a guide in determining how the morality exception (similar to
EPC Article 53(a)) should be interpreted. 9 Under the Directive,
biological material isolated from the human body or other natural
environment is patentable, as are uses of human embryos for thera-
peutic purposes, and plants and animals not confined to particular
varieties.26 Conversely, and confusingly, the Directive excludes
from patentability the following examples as morally or ethically
unacceptable patent subject matter: processes to produce chimera
from germ or totipotent human and animal cells, human cloning,
commercial uses of human embryos, and processes for modifying the
genetic identity of animals that may cause them suffering without
substantial medical benefits.26'
The Directive is clearly a result of political compromise, agreed
upon by member states after ten years of negotiation.262 An early
256. See Council Directive 98/44/EC, 11 1-4, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13 [hereinafter Council
Directive].
257. See, e.g., Gitter, supra note 252, at 2; David G. Scalise & Daniel Nugent, Patenting
Living Matter in the European Community: Diriment of the Draft Directive, 16 FORDHAM INTL
L.J. 990,991 (1993) (characterizing Europe's competitive disadvantage in the biotech industry
as "approaching perilous dimensions").
258. See Council Directive, supra note 256, 11 36-40; see also Gitter, supra note 252, at 2.
259. Council Directive, supra note 256, 1 38, arts. 5-6
260. Id. arts. 2, 5.
261. Id. 1 38, arts. 5-6. The Directive also contains a farmer's exemption and other
exclusions from patentability. Id. arts. 4, 11, 12.
262. DINWOODIE ETAL., supra note 99 ("As eventually adopted, the directive attempts [ a
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draft of the Directive, which was "vehemently opposed" by the Green
Group in the European Parliament, was modified significantly
before the final document was approved.' Unfortunately, some
member states left their public constituents out of the dialogue until
after approval of the Directive, resulting in extremely negative
public reaction to the agreement. 26' Reaction to the Directive proved
so negative that a group of member states filed a lawsuit in the
European Court of Justice requesting the annulment of the
Directive based on issues with its adoption, its conflicting provisions
on human patenting, and basic human rights concerns. 2a Several
member states also defied EU law by failing to create national laws
to implement the Directive by the July 30, 2000 deadline.2" Failure
to implement the Directive can subject a state to infringement
proceedings and sanctions by other members.' 7 Opposition to the
political compromise between environmental and animal rights activists on the one hand, and
proponents of a U.S. style system with very narrow exceptions to the general rule that
'anything under the sun made by man' is patentable."). See also Scalise & Nugent, supra note
257, at 991 (1993) (noting that the first proposal for the directive was presented by the EC
Commission to the EC Council on October 20, 1988).
263. See DINWOODIE, ETAL., supra note 99, at 432.
264. See Sabine Louet, French Refuse to Implement Biotech Patent Directive, available
athttp/www.nature.com/cgi-taVDynaPage.taffile=/nbtjounmal/v19/nl/full/nbt010l66.htm
(last modified Aug., 2000) (quoting French MP Jean-Francois Mattei as explaining that
opposition was emerging at that time because there had been no public discussion about the
directive in France previously).
265. See Case C-377/98, Kingdom of the Netherlands v. Eur. Parliament & Council of the
Eur. Union, 2001 E.C.R.I-7079. The action was filed by the Netherlands and joined by Italy
and Norway. See Council of Europe Calls for Revision of Biotechnology Directive, EUR. REPORT
No. 2514, Jul. 5, 2000, at 1. One report provides an example of the confusion:
Problems notably arise regarding the precise scope of Article 5 of Directive
98/44/EC concerning the protection liable to be extended to inventions
concerning elements drawn from the human body. The first paragraph of this
article indicates that "the human body at the various stages of its constitution
and development, as well as the mere discovery of one of its constituent
elements, including a complete or partial gene sequence, cannot constitute
patentable elements." However, the next paragraph of the same article
stipulates that "an element isolated from the human body or otherwise produced
though some technical process, including a complete or partial gene sequence,
can be considered to constitute a patentable invention, even if its structure is
identical to that of a natural element."
Luxembourg Parliament Calls for Renegotiation of Inventions Directive, EUR. REPORT No.
2665, Mar. 6,2002, at 1.
266. See Single Market: Ten Years On, Commission Has Something to Celebrate, EuR.
REPORT No. 2647, Jan. 8, 2003, at 1 (hereinafter Single Market].
267. See Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (The Treaty of Rome),
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Directive is so fierce, however, that as of early 2003, and in spite of
losing the legal challenge to the Directive, nine of the fifteen EU
member states had not incorporated the Directive into their
national laws.2
Some commentators criticize the Directive for its continued
inclusion of moral and ethical considerations suggesting, among
other things, that the morality provision will impede the Directive's
dual goals due to vagueness and conflicting interpretations by
member states, and that patent examiners should not be forced to
make moral and ethical judgments about inventions. 269 Although
these points are well taken, it is unlikely that any political compro-
mise in this area would ever be satisfactory to all parties.20 The
Directive, however, is noteworthy and commendable for its earnest,
albeit inconsistent, attempt to provide specific guidance to patent
Mar. 25, 1957, art. 226, 298 U.N.T.S. 89; see also Single Market, supra note 266, at 1.
268. See Kingdom of the Netherlands, supra note 265, at 14; see also Single Market, supra
note 266. France's Justice Minister publicly denounced the Directive claim that it was
"incompatible with French law in general, with the 1994 law on bioethics, with the code on
industrial property and with the French code of civil law which prohibits the
commercialisation of the human body.* Community Law Takes Precedence OverNational Law,
Euu. REPORT No. 2510, Jun. 21, 2000, at 1.
On November 30,2000, and December 19,2002, the EU Commission sent letters of formal
notice and official requests, respectively, to the nine remaining countries, Germany, Austria,
Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden, requesting that
they implement the Directive. See Press Release, Commission of the European Communities,
Industrial Property: Commission Calls on Nine Member States to Implement the Directive on
the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, RAPID, IP/02/1928 (Dec. 19,2002). These
actions are the first steps in the process of bringing infringement proceedings against non-
compliant states under the Article 226 of the EC Treaty. Apparently, the resisting members
hope to create sufficient momentum for a renegotiation of the Directive to clarify ambiguities
and further address moral and ethical concerns. See Luxembourg Parliament Calls for
Renegotiation of Inventions Directive, supra note 265, at 1.
269. See, e.g., Chambers, supra note 10, at 225; Gitter, supra note 252 at 3; Cynthia M. Ho,
supra note 86, at 248; Lydia Nenow, Comment, To Patent or not To Patent: The European
Union's New Biotech Directive, 23 HoUS. J. INVT L. 569, 573 (2001).
270. See, e.g., Chambers, supra note 10, at 244 (suggesting that the directives ordrepublic
and morality provision is too vague and will inhibit the advancement of the biotechnology
industry); Gitter, supra note 252, at 3-4 (suggesting that the morality provision will impede
the Directive's dual goals due to its vagueness, which will lead to conflicting interpretations
by member states); Ho, supra note 86, at 280-82 (stating that the ethical component of the
directive will result in uncertainty and inflexibility in defining unpatentable biotechnological
inventions); Nenow, supra note 269, at 597-98 (arguing that patent examiners should not be
forced to make moral and ethical judgments about inventions).
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offices and courts on what, from the legislature's view, constitutes
morally unacceptable patent subject matter.
3. Canada: Bucking the Trend
In December 2002, the Canadian Supreme Court stunned the
world by denying patent protection to the Harvard oncomouse, the
same mouse first patented in the United States in 1987 and then
patented a few years later in the EPO.271 Unlike the EPC or EU
Biotech Directive, the Canadian Patent Act does not contain an
express statutory provision allowing for a morality inquiry into
patent subject matter.272 Rather, it simply has a provision defining
an invention that is nearly identical to 35 U.S.C. § 101.273 Under
section 2 of the Canadian Patent Act, an invention is "any new and
useful art, process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter,
or any new and useful improvement in any art, process, machine,
manufacture or composition of matter."27 4
In interpreting this statutory provision, the Canadian court
traveled the road not taken by the U.S. Supreme Court in Diamond
v. Chakrabarty.275 The Canadian court, in a 5-4 decision, concluded
that the words "manufacture" and "composition of matter" in the
statute did not encompass higher life forms if read "in their entire
271. Harvard Coll. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), 120021 SCC 76,219 D.L.R. (4th)
577. See discussion supra Part II.A.1. Harvard's Canadian patent application was initially
filed in 1985. Harvard Coll. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [20021 SCC 76, 219 D.L.R.
(4th) 577, at para. 121.
272. See Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 27(3) (1993) (Can.); EPC Article 53(a), supra note 46;
European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Directive 98/441EC, ch. 1 art. 6,
1998 O.J. (L 213) 13, 18. However, as noted by the dissent, in 1993, the Canadian Parliament
repealed a prohibition against patenting "an invention that has an illicit object in view" and
did not include a blanket "ordre public or morality" provision even though the statutory
revision was to bring Canadian law into compliance with international agreements. Harvard
Coll. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [20021 SCC 76,219 D.L.R. (4th) 577, at 14 (Binnie,
J., dissenting).
273. Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 2 (1985) (Can.). Section 101 of the U.S. Patent Act
authorizes patents for 'any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof...." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). Apparently,
the provisions are so close because the Canadian definition is taken from the U.S. Patent Act
of 1793. Harvard Coll. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), 12002] SCC 76,219 D.L.R. (4th)
577, at 3 (Binnie, J., dissenting).
274. Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4, § 2 (1985) (Can.).
275. See supra text accompanying notes 63-72.
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context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously
with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act and the intention
of Parliament. 76 The court noted that the Commissioner of Patents
lacked the discretion to deny a patent on the basis of public policy
considerations, but was bound by the statutory provision.277 The
court also distinguished the statute from the U.S. Patent Act by
stressing that Parliament did not define "invention" as "anything
under the sun made by man," that the patentability of higher life
forms was not contemplated by Parliament, and that it was for
Parliament to provide expressly for the patenting of such subject
matter.
The court's decision met with both praise and criticism 279 and
elicited an eloquent and forceful dissent from Justice Binnie.2' The
court's decision is surprising, as it is so at odds with the decision in
its neighbor the United States in Diamond v. Chakrabarty.el By
declining to expand the category of patent-eligible subject matter to
include controversial higher life forms, however, the court placed
the decision on the correct institutional actor: the legislature. As the
court explained:
The lack of direction currently in the Patent Act to deal with
issues that might reasonably arise signals a legislative intention
that higher life forms are currently not patentable.... [Tihis
Court does not possess the institutional competence to deal
with issues of this complexity, which presumably will require
Parliament to engage in public debate, a balancing of competing
societal interests and intricate legislative drafting.12
276. Harvard Coll. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2002] SCC 76,219 D.L.R. (4th)
577, at para. 155.
277. Id. para. 152.
278. Id. para. 158.
279. See, e.g., Stuart Laidlaw, A Poem as Lovely as a Mouse, THE TORONTO STAR, Dec. 7,
2002, at H06 (noting diverse reactions to the decision); Kirk Makin, Harvard Mouse Patent
Rejected: It's Up to Parliament To Determine Use of Altered Life Forms, Top Court Decides,
THE GLOBE & MAIL, Dec. 6, 2002, at A4 (same); Rachel Ross, Of Mice and Patents and
Copyright Law, THE TORoNTo STAR, Dec. 9, 2002, at D02 (same).
280. Harvard Coll. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [20021 SCC 76, 219 D.L.R. (4th)
577, at para. 1-117 (Binnie, J., dissenting) (citing, among other things, evidence from pending
legislation that Parliament intended higher life forms to be patentable).
281. See supra notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
282. Harvard Coll. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2002] SCC 76,219 D.L.R. (4th),
at para. 158. A Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee Report in June 2002 may have
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Similarly, Congress-not the courts, the USPTO, or patent
applicants-is the institutional actor in the United States most
competent to set the limits of patent-eligible subject matter.2
4. TRIPs: Multinational Accommodation
The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPs) represents a world first: an agreement by more than
140 nations on substantive minimum protections for intellectual
property.2 The TRIPs Agreement succeeded where prior intellec-
tual property agreements failed by tying requirements for substan-
tive protections, such as a standard patent term, with trade.' This
important connection means that a member state's failure to comply
with TRIPs requirements can result in trade sanctions by other
members following a binding dispute resolution proceeding.'
Beyond the member countries of the EPC are numerous other
countries with statutory provisions allowing inventions to be ex-
cluded from patentability on the basis of morality.S7 Thus, it is not
influenced the court. This report concluded that members of Parliament must have the final
say an the patentability of plant and animal life, because the current patent regime did not
cover these issues. See CANADIAN BIOTECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMMITrEE, PATENTING OF
HIGHER LIFE FORMS AND RELATED ISsUES 7 (June 2002); Developments in Biotechnology
Require Decisions on Patenting Life, CAN. PREsS, Jun. 7, 2002, available at 2002 WL
21938397.
283. See Laruen Cirlin, Human or Animal: A Resolution to the Biotechnological Blurring
of the Lines, 32 Sw. U. L. REV. 501, 519 (2003).
284. Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPs Agreement).
285. See, e.g., Margo A. Bagley, Legal Movements in IP: TRIPs, Unilateral Action, Bilateral
Agreements, and HIVIAIDS, 18 EMORY INTI L. REV. (forthcoming 2003); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss
& Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay Round- Putting TRIPs and
Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INTL L. 275, 277 (1997) (noting that TRIPs provides
member states with a binding venue to resolve intellectual property disputes for the first time
by conditioning continued membership in the World Trade Organization on compliance with
TRIPs).
286. See World Trade Organization, Settling Disputes, http-J/www.wto.org/english/
thewto-e/whatis_e/tif_e/disple.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2003).
287. See, e.g., Agreement Relating to the Creation of an African Intellectual Property
Organization, Constituting a Revision of the Agreement Relating to the Creation of an African
and Malagasy Office of Industrial Property (OAPI), in J.W. BAXTER, WORLD PATENT LAW §
10.23 (Matthew Bender 2002) (specifying as unpatentable inventions that are "contrary to
PATENT FIRST
surprising that in TRIPs negotiations, this large group of countries
was able to incorporate a morality provision into the agreement
despite U.S. opposition.2
This right is expressed in TRIPs Article 27(2), which requires that
members provide patents for inventions in all fields of technology
with one significant caveat: "Members may exclude from patent-
ability inventions ... [where such exclusion] is necessary to protect
ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or
plant life or health . In other words, member nations do not
have to provide patent protection for at least some morally contro-
versial inventions. By providing this morality-based safe harbor,
TRIPs accommodates both the U.S view that "anything under the
sun made by man" is patent-eligible and the views of many other
countries that deny patents on morally controversial inventions.,
The idea that morality concerns may be the basis for denying
patent protection appears to be a common theme among world
patent systems. Even the United States once ascribed to that view
as evidenced by the moral utility doctrine, though the Supreme
Court's broad interpretation of § 101 of the Patent Act has elimi-
nated morality considerations from the patent-eligibility inquiry in
this country.' Nevertheless, it makes sense for the United States
to rejoin other nations in placing some moral limits on certain
categories of patents, even if the United States differs with other
countries on the nature or scope of those limits.
public order or morality"). Member states of the OAPI are Benin, Burkina-Faso, Cameroon,
Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Gabon Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Togo. Other countries with statutory morality exclusions to
patentability include Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, European Union member countries, the
Czech Republic, Iceland, Romania, and Angola. See id. §§ 10.16, 16.01-.25. In addition to the
United States, Canada and Mexico are among countries without statutory explicit statutory
morality provisions. See Edwin S. Flores Troy, The Development of Modern Frameworks for
Patent Protection: Mexico, A Model for Reform, 6 TEX. INTsLL. PROP. L.J. 133, 155 (1998).
288. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 284, art. 27(2).
289. Id. Diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical methods may also be excluded.
290. See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
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III. To LIMIT OR NOT To LIMIT: CONSIDERATIONS IN ADDRESSING
MORALLY CONTROVERSIAL BIOTECH PATENTS
If the United States is to have morality-based limits on patent
subject matter eligibility, who shall set the limits, and how? One
certainly would not wish to repeat the EPC and EU experiences in
articulating morality standards for patent subject matter, and yet
delineating moral boundaries for patents is likely to be far more
difficult here than in Europe for a variety of reasons. The U.S.
Congress has no political equivalent of the Green Party group in
the European Parliament, with its strong focus on environmental
protection and preservation, social justice, and human and animal
rights." 1 Moreover, the morality exception has been in the EPC
since its inception in the 1970s, and many countries had similar
limitations in their patent laws prior to joining the EPC while the
United States has never had a statutory morality exception to
patentability. 2
As discussed previously, patent applicants are currently setting
such limits by the contents of the applications they file in the
USPTO." 3 Just as the USPTO has no statutory basis on which to
deny patents on controversial technologies that meet the specified
patentability requirements, the courts have no basis for reading
moral limitations into any of the current patent provisions.2
Consequently, the only actor with the institutional competence to
dictate the limits of patentable subject matter is the one given that
authority by the Constitution: Congress.295 What is required, then,
291. The European Federation of Green Parties is composed of thirty-one Green political
parties in twenty-nine European nations. Green Parties have as their guiding principles, eco-
development, which focuses on sustainability and social justice; global security, directed to
preventing armed conflicts and eradicating global poverty and the causes of war; and new
citizenship, which advocates the protection of a variety of fundamental human rights and the
promotion of democratic and transparent governments. History, European Greens, http'l/
www.europeangreens.orginfo/history.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2003).
292. See supra notes 74-75, 218-19 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 84-90, 192-94 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. See also Kass, supra note 189, at 50 ("Under
our Constitution, it is for the legislature, to decide such questions, and the courts ought not
to rewrite the rules. Further, denial of individual patent applications seems a poor way for
society to decide questions about allegedly dangerous research and tehcnology.").
295. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
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is a legislative solution with real guidance for the USPTO and real
language for the judiciary to interpret.
Admittedly, public choice theory would militate against congres-
sional action in this area, because legislators are perceived to be
subject to interest group capture to facilitate rent seeking.2" The
effect of special interest groups in patent law is evident in the
nature of congressional action regarding the transgenic mouse
patent and the ban on enforcement of medical methods against
medical practitioners.297 Nevertheless, a decision to ban patents on
humans, for example, would implicate ideological concerns that,
if the public were sufficiently aroused, could overcome interest
group capture to some extent, or at least focus it on the contours
of the ban, versus on the ban itself. As noted by one commentator,
"organized interests will have less influence on the general nature
of the [ideological] legislation that is passed than they will on the
detailed implementation and enforcement of that legislation."29 ' Of
the available options, Congress seems clearly to be the best suited
to make determinations in the context of setting federal patent
policy for all technologies. Moreover, as articulated by the courts,
Congress is the only body with the authority to adjust the scope of
patent subject matter.
296. See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001
ILL. L. REv. 387, 399 (2001) (citations omitted):
Public choice theory builds upon the premise that a rational politician will act
to maximize his or her utility (defined in terms of retaining office). Interest
groups can intervene to alter the politician's calculus of social costs and benefits.
In particular, powerful interest groups might influence a legislator to act
contrary to probable constituent wishes by offering political benefits that exceed
the costs of diverging from the constituents' wishes.
See also Jonathan R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public
Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REv. 471, 495-96 (1988)
(discussing differing views of the impact of the separation of government powers on interest
group activity and legislative capture).
297. See supra Part II.A.L.a-b.
298. Dwight R. Lee, Politics, Ideology, and the Power of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 191,
196 (1988); see also Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice,
65 TEx. L. REv. 873, 926 (1987) ("The social science literature suggests that ideology plays an
important role in the political process; thus neither voters nor legislators are wholly captives
of self-interest.").
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A. Legislating Patent Rights or Morality?
Often, when the public perceives that Congress is legislating
morality, red flags go up.' Many people in society are concerned
that legislation that effectuates morality-based policies will un-
acceptably encroach upon the freedoms of choice and belief that are
so fundamental to this democracy.3" Is legislation concerning
moral issues truly anathema in our society? To a large extent, such
legislation is critically necessary for our way of life and for our
society to continue. Rules that allow society to operate in an orderly
fashion and protect values we hold dear often have moral overtones.
The government legislates in the areas of pornography, criminal
offenses such as stealing and murder (both of which are generally
considered morally wrong), corporate conduct, and more.0 1 Would
creating legislation to deny government-granted property rights
over certain types of subject matter in order to further policies re-
lating to the public welfare, the protection of human dignity, animal
welfare, and environmental preservation be legislating morality or
patent rights? Probably some of both. Legislation barring patents on
certain subject matter for moral reasons arguably is not morality
299. See, e.g., Zach Calef, Politicians Can't Raise Your Kids for You, IOWA STATE DAILY,
Jun. 26, 2001, available at http'//www.Iowastatedaily.comtvnews/display.amparsan/ART/
2002/06/26/36381470c206a?in_archive=1 (criticizing congressional efforts to prevent
marketing of explicit material to children as legislating morality); Chandra Jacobs, A Vote for
Pot, THE CHRONICLE, Nov. 6, 2002 (advocating the legalization of marijuana and less
regulation of morality by government); Jon Swartz, How Best to Protect Kids Online, S.F.
CHRON., Feb. 1, 1999, at B1 (discussing the Child Online Protection Act and concluding that
[ylou can't legislate decency on a national scale").
300. See, eg., Jacobs, supra note 299; Swartz, supra note 299.
301. See Katherine Shaw Spaht & Symeon C. Symeonides, Covenant Marriage and the Law
of Conflicts of Laws, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1085, 1089 (1999) ("Despite protestations
synoptically described by the oft-repeated phrase 'you can't legislate morals,' everyone knows
that Congress and legislatures do it every day."). Corporate governance in the wake of the
Enron debacle is a recent focus of morality-based legislation. As one commentator notes:
I have heard others say, when speaking to the current corporate governance
crisis, that "you can't legislate morality." Well, yes you can! And you can also
engage in social engineering! As Exhibit A, I offer up the Securities & Exchange
Acts of 1933 and 1934. Whether it is utilizing the rule of law against the
ultimate immoral act, murder, and on down the line, including unprecedented
public corporate thievery, we do not rely on conscience alone to govern ourselves
or to regulate the economic marketplace to assure its openness and fairness.
Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., 21st Century Corporate Responsibility-'Evolution, Revolution, or Back
to the Future?," 54 MERCER L. REv. 671, 673 (2003) (citation omitted).
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legislation because an invention ineligible for patent protection can
still be practiced. In fact, it can be practiced by more entities than
if covered by a patent but there would not be the same economic
incentives or "fuel" for doing so. As stated by the Supreme Court:
The grant or denial of patents on microorganisms is not likely to
put an end to genetic research or to its attendant risks. The
large amount of research that has already occurred when no
researcher had sure knowledge that patent protection would
be available suggests that legislative or judicial fiat as to
patentability will not deter the scientific mind from probing into
the unknown any more than Canute could command the tides.
Whether respondent's claims are patentable may determine
whether research efforts are accelerated by the hope of reward or
slowed by want of incentives, but that is all.30 2
Consequently, legislation excluding morally controversial subject
matter from patent protection would not stop research into such
subject matter from taking place. Rather, it would reduce the
incentives for conducting the research and keep certain fruits of
such research in the public domain precisely because either the
underlying activity is either (1) so controversial that the government
should not place its imprimatur on it via a patent grant, or (2) so
socially beneficial that government should not grant anyone
exclusive rights in it. 3"3 Because moral objections are directed to the
issuance of patents on either type of subject matter, not just the
underlying activity (which society may or may not want to promote),
legislation barring patents due to morality concerns could be
perceived as a form of morality legislation.
302. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980) (emphasis added).
303. In all likelihood, any legislation in this area would prohibit patents only on some of
the inventions derived from research in morally controversial areas. For example, 35 U.S.C.
§ 287(c) only bars patent enforcement actions against medical practitioners who perform
claimed "medical activities, such as medical or surgical procedures" (process claims) on a body.
The provision does not apply to the activities of people engaged in the commercial
development, manufacture, sale, importation, or distribution of a patented machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or the provision of pharmacy or clinical lab services
involving patented subject matter. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(cX3) (2000). Likewise, at least some
inventions (processes, machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter) developed during
research on morally controversial biotech subject matter would likely be eligible for patent
protection.
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Undoubtedly, such legislation could have the effect of reducing
discoveries and innovations in certain biotech areas of inquiry, a
consequence which cannot be dismissed lightly. Because patents
require disclosure, such legislation could also have the negative
effect of keeping such research hidden from public view and
potential regulations. However, there are already areas of scientific
research society does not promote or condone for moral reasons,
such as various types of experiments on human subjects, despite the
fact that useful, even life-saving information might be generated
thereby. The blurring of the line between human and nonhuman
animals occasioned by biotechnological advances and the lack of
consensus on when life begins for human embryos and fetuses used
for research purposes, among other things, supports the desirability
of having at least an initial decision regarding the patent eligibility
of morally controversial biotech subject matter be made by an
informed Congress.
B. Fueling Fires
According to Abraham Lincoln, patents "added the fuel of interest
to the fire of genius, in the discovery and production of new and
useful things." °4 In other words, the expectation of a monopoly-like
patent grant provides a significant incentive to inventors not only
to engage in the creative process but also to disclose their inventions
through the medium of the patent system. Such an incentive was
clearly contemplated by the Framers, as the Intellectual Property
Clause of the Constitution authorizes Congress to secure exclusive
rights to inventors over their inventions in order to promote the
progress of the useful arts. 5 The Framers did not adopt a natural
rights view of intellectual property, under which an inventor
would be entitled to exclusive rights to her invention by the simple
expedient of having invented it.3°0 Instead, the Clause is a utilitar-
304. Abraham Lincoln, Lecture on Discoveries and Inventions (1859), cited in MICHAEL
NOvAK, THE FIRE OF INVENTION, THE FUEL OF INTERES'. ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 6 (AEI
Press 1996).
305. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. According to the Supreme Court: "The patent laws
promote this progress by offering inventors exclusive rights for a limited period as an
incentive for their inventiveness and research efforts." Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 307.
306. See supra text accompanying notes 48-52.
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ian grant of power, not a mandate, and Congress is free to deny
patent protection as well as to extend it. As explained by Thomas
Jefferson, the first administrator of the U.S. patent system:
Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property.
Society may give an exclusive right to the profits arising from
them, as an encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may
produce utility, but this may or may not be done, according to
the will and convenience of the society, without claim or
complaint from any body.0 7
Congress, as authorized by the Constitution, determines which
federal patent policy levers will best promote the progress of the
useful arts. Congress is the arbiter of what inventions are eligible
for patent protection, and Congress has made clear that as a matter
of policy, not all inventions are patentable and thus patent incen-
tive is not available for all inventions. For example, unpatentable
inventions include those that fall within the categories of abstract
ideas, laws of nature or natural phenomena, inventions that are
obvious,308 inventions that may impact national security, 3° and
inventions solely useful in connection with special nuclear material
or atomic weapons.3 10
Furthermore, once a patent is granted, Congress may still limit
the enforcement of that patent. Examples of government limitations
on issued patents include the unenforceability of medical process
patents against medical practitioners3 ' and a variety of compulsory
patent-licensing provisions.
A compulsory license is a type of government-sanctioned patent
infringement. The license allows third parties to perform otherwise
307. VI WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, at 180-81 (Washington ed.) cited in Graham v.
John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 n.2 (1966).
308. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
309. 35 U.S.C. § 181 (2000) (authorizing the Commissioner of Patents to order that an
invention be kept secret and to withhold the publication of an application or grant of a patent
on the invention).
310. 42 U.S.C. § 2181 (2000).
311. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2000). See discussion supra note 132. Congress enacted 35 U.S.C.
§ 287(c) in response to public furor over the assertion of a medical process patent against a
doctor using the claimed method to treat patients. Section 287(c) eliminates any remedy a
patent owner might otherwise be entitled to as a result of patent infringement, if a medical
practitioner uses the claimed method.
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infringing activities by paying a mandated royalty to the patent
holder.3' Several federal statutes provide for compulsory licensing
of inventions. Examples include inventions related to air pollution
control devices under the Clean Air Act, 13 atomic energy in-
ventions under the Atomic Energy Act,314 and a general provision
for licensing inventions for federal government use in return for
"reasonable and entire compensation."'
One unusual licensing statute was the 1917 Trading with the
Enemy Act,316 which authorized the President to license enemy-
owned patents to U.S. citizens when, in his opinion, the license
would be for the public welfare and "tend to the successful prosecu-
tion of the war."31 7 The grant was in the nature of a compulsory
license in that the government required the U.S. citizen to pay
royalties for use of the patented invention to a government custo-
dian with the proviso that the owner of the patent could file an
action to obtain the royalties after the end of the war.318 Congress,
however, later amended the Act and gave the government custodian
the authority to seize the patents and sell them to third parties.31 9
In adjudicating a dispute regarding royalties collected on several
patents, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit described the
basis for the congressional action.320 Speaking of the German plain-
tiffs, the court opined:
They were, however, at that time enemy owners and it was
because of that characterization and of the exigencies of war as
well, that the use and enjoyment of the patented inventions were
taken from them and, in the interest of the public welfare and
the successful prosecution of the war, turned over to the defen-
dant through the medium of a license. 21
312. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 47, at 1235.
313. See 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2003).
314. 42 U.S.C. § 2183 (2000).
315. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2000).
316. 50 U.S.C. app. § 10 (1917) (repealed 1946).
317. Farbwerke Vormals Meister Lucius & Bruningv. Chem. Found., 39 F.2d 366,367 (3d
Cir. 1930). The Act also applied to trademarks and copyrights. 50 U.S.C. app. § 10 (1917)
(repealed 1946).
318. Farbwerke, 39 F.2d at 368.
319. Id. at 370.
320. Id. at 369-70.
321. Id. (emphasis added).
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Thus the license, as with all compulsory licenses, was designed to
further some rational congressional purpose. As the Supreme Court
explained:
[tihe authority of Congress is exercised in the hope that "[tihe
productive effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on
society through the introduction of new products and processes
of manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by way of
increased employment and better lives for our citizens."
Congress designed the patent system to have a positive effect on
society, so it is certainly appropriate for Congress to limit the
availability of patent protection when government-granted private
ownership of certain subject matter may have a negative effect on
society.323 Patents on morally controversial biotech subject matter,
although having the potential for positive effects, also have a great
potential for negative effects that may be difficult or impossible to
overcome after such patents have issued.3 2' The incentives patents
provide to researchers to engage in patent-eligible research make it
incumbent upon Congress to determine ex ante which "fires" to
"fuel" with patent protection.
C. Specificity v. Generality: The Dilemma
In making that ex ante determination, Congress should tread
very carefully. Social mores change over time and technology clearly
advances with time as well.325 It can be difficult to make subject-
322. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,307 (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470,480-81 (1974) (emphasis added)).
323. Id. at 318 ("Congress is free to amend § 101 so as to exclude from patent protection
organisms produced by genetic engineering.... Or it may choose to craft a statute specifically
designed for such living things.*).
324. See generally Dann, supra note 200 (discussing stem cell research and positing that
"it may be worth considering that those who constantly warn of 'the slippery slope' may be
right this time. Will our treatment of the human embryo and fetus lead to a desensitization
of our conviction in the inherent worth of life, human or otherwise?").
325. Mark L. Johnson, How Moral Psychology Changes Moral Theory, in MIND AND
MORALs: ESSAYs ON COGNrrwvE ScIENcE AND ETHics 45,65 (Larry May et al. eds., 1996). The
author states:
Because our moral understanding is necessarily partial, morality is not a set of
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matter rules in the abstract, when the technology to which the rules
will be applied has not been developed. There may not, and probably
will not, be full public consensus on morality constraints on patent-
eligible subject matter, but Congress is used to legislating in such
areas and has a variety of options open to it.3 26 In the words of one
legislator, "[a]lthough it is difficult to legislate in these complex
areas, Congress-as the elected representatives of the people-must
play a role in seeing that a forum for discussion is provided and
that these important problems are addressed openly." 27 Moreover,
legislating prospectively, although difficult, is generally preferable
to legislating retrospectively, especially when property rights are
involved. As explained by Professor Lon Fuller, "[t]aken by itself...
a retroactive law is truly a monstrosity. Law has to do with the
governance of human conduct by rules. To speak of governing or
directing conduct today by rules that will be enacted tomorrow is to
talk in blank prose."3
Because retroactive legislation is so undesirable, Congress is
unlikely to enact such legislation in response to the issuance of a
morally controversial biotech patent. Therefore, even if Congress
passes a law to prevent the patenting of similar subject matter in
the future, the patent on which the controversy was based will
remain viable and enforceable.
In terms of options, Congress could, of course, choose to acquiesce
intentionally in the current "patent first" system and do nothing. An
informed Congress, aware of the lack of morality-based limitations
in the patent system, could make the normative choice to have a
patent statute that defaults in favor of patent eligibility yet allows
for reactive legislation. Such a result could be quite appealing to
members of Congress, as the political fallout from placing morality
based limits on patent-eligible subject matter is an unquantifiable
absolute, universal rules but an on-going experimental process. We must
continually be experimenting with new possibilities for action, new conceptions
of human flourishing, and new forms of interaction that permit us to adjust to,
and also to manage, the ever-changing conditions of human existence.
Id See also Harold J. Berman, Toward an Integrative Jurisprudence: Politics, Morality,
History, 76 CALIF. L. REv. 779, 787 (1988) ("What is morally right in one set of historical
circumstances may be morally wrong in another.").
326. Hatfield, supra note 102, at 8-9.
327. Id. at 9-10.
328. FULLER, supra note 35, at 53.
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risk. Alternatively and preferably, though likely more hazardous
from a political standpoint, Congress could enact specific, subject
matter-based legislation, more general morality-based legislation,
or legislation implementing one or more of a variety of intermediate
institutional procedures.3" Each approach has benefits and draw-
backs that Congress should consider in its efforts to define the
moral limits of patent-eligible subject matter.
Congress could enact a broad, general morality provision like
Article 53(a) of the EPC' 0 or Article 27 of TRIPs.33 Such a provi-
sion, allowing the USPTO to deny patents on the basis of morality,
would provide the Agency with substantial discretion in making
patent eligibility determinations, and would leave the salient
interpretive questions to the judiciary branch that is perhaps best
suited to engage in line drawing of this sort. Although generality in
a statute can provide important flexibility, it can also lead to
arbitrary, overly broad, or overly narrow interpretations, which are
arguably problems exemplified in the balancing, unacceptability,
and public abhorrence tests under the EPC." 2 Such generality could
in effect result in returningthe United States to a "moral utility"
type of regime, without any meaningful subject matter-based
patent-eligibility limits.'
An important difference in the United States versus under the
EPC is the presence of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
329. My goal in this Article is not to specify which particular approach Congress should
take, but rather to expose and focus attention upon a very real problem and identify a variety
of avenues open to Congress in addressing the problem.
330. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
331. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 284, at art. 27.
332. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
333. Professor Lon Fuller illustrated such an approach and its attendant dangers using a
hypothetical legislator opposed to gambling on moral grounds:
As a statutory draftsman he will confront the difficulty of distinguishing
between gambling for small stakes as an innocent amusement and gambling in
its more desperate and harmful forms. If no formula [of specificity] comes readily
to hand for this purpose, he may be tempted to draft his statute so as to include
every kind of gambling, leaving it to the prosecutor to distinguish the innocent
from the truly harmful. Before embracing this expedient, often described
euphemistically as "selective enforcement," our moralist turned lawmaker will
have to reflect on the dangerous consequences that would attend a widened
application of that principle, already a pervasive part of the actual machinery
of law enforcement.
FULLER, supra note 35, at 7.8.
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(CAFC) which reviews appeals from USPTO decisions and would be
able to craft uniform interpretations of such a statutory provision.
Under the EPC, there is no court with jurisdiction to hear an appeal
from an EPO Board of Appeals decision.33 Although the CAFC
appears averse to making patent policy in the absence of statutory
authority, it is quite comfortable in the role of statutory interpreter.
Alternatively, Congress could enact specific legislation that would
detail subject matter expressly ineligible for patent protection. The
EU Biotechnology Directive is an example of a specific, subject
matter-based statute, but the problems engendered by the drafting
of that provision illustrate the limitations of such an approach.'
Specific legislation will give more guidance to the USPTO and
courts in making patent eligibility determinations. Some specific
prohibitions, however, could be rendered effectively obsolete, or
simply incomplete, by unanticipated advances in technology.' To
minimize these potential problems, Congress could decide to ignore
morality concerns for the vast majority of inventions and have a
very simple specific provision dealing only with an extreme limit,
such as expressly prohibiting patents on humans, and/or human-
animal chimera, with the definition of "human" provided in the
statute.337 Such a provision, in the form of Senator Brownback's
amendment, may soon be debated by Congress.' Even that limited
provision would be an improvement over the current U.S. "anything
under the sun made by man" approach.3 9
334. See Lenzing AG's European Patent (UK), 119971 R.P.C. 245 (Ch. D. 1996).
335. See id.
336. See Ho, supra note 86, at 284 ([Mhe type of in-depth consideration necessary prior
to developing such a fundamental change to the patent system would inevitably lag behind
the progression of technology and the issuance of controversial patents.").
337. See generally Walker, supra note 148, 109-11 (favoring near-human patenting but
providing an express definition for human).
338. See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
339. As this Article was going to press, congressional legislators reached an agreement to
enact a one year appropriations measure disallowing funding to be used to grant patents on
human organisms. See Jim Abrams, Lawmakers Weigh Ban on Patents for Human Organisms,
WASH. PosT (Nov. 24, 2003), available at http'//www.washingtonpostcom/wp.dyn/articles/
A10942-2003Nov.24.html; Bar on 'Human Organism' Patents Will Be Added to Senate
Appropriations Bill, 67 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1647, at 47 (Nov. 21,2003).
However, because human-cloning process patents would still be allowable after the
amendment, patents encompassing human organisms will still issue from the USPTO. As
discussed, 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(g) allows owners of process patents the importation of products
made by the patented process. See discussion supra Part II.A.l.d. Also, because this is an
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A third option open to Congress is the implementation of one or
more intermediate approaches to corralling morally controversial
biotech subject matter. For example, Congress could choose to re-
activate the Office of Technology Assessment, a critically acclaimed
group that for twenty-three years provided meticulously researched,
nonpartisan reports to Congress on technological topics of emerg-
ing importance.3" To the extent Congress would like time to study
and evaluate the potential impact of morally controversial patents
before their issuance, the USPTO could be required to submit
special reports to a designated evaluator after receiving patent
applications claiming morally controversial subject matter. If the
designated evaluator, such as an ethics advisory committee within
or outside of the USPTO," 1 did not notify the applicant of an
objection within a set period of time, the subject matter would be
deemed eligible for patent protection. This would be similar to the
current national security provisions of the Invention Secrecy Act," 2
whereby a patent applicant is entitled to a foreign filing license for
her invention if she does not hear otherwise from the USPTO within
six months of filing her application.3 Moreover, a process could be
instituted in which issuance of morally controversial patents would
be delayed for a set period, during which time Congress, or its
designated evaluator, could assess the patent-eligible status of the
appropriations measure, and not an amendment to the Patent Act, it would need to be
renewed annually to remain in force.
340. OTA Archive, Office of Technology Assessment, http://www.access.gpo.gov/ota/ (last
visited Oct. 25, 2003). In the years before its demise the OTA prepared several reports related
to new developments in biotechnology including one that considered the arguments for and
against patenting transgenic animals. The report assumed, however, that humans would not
be patentable based on the PTOs April 21, 1987 statement and a bill that had passed the
House banning patents on humans. See Office of Technology Assessment, New Developments
in Biotechnology: Patenting Life-Special Report, ch. 8, at 135, OTA Publications, available at
http// www.wws.prineton.edu/-ota/ns20/alpha_f.html (last modified April, 1989).
341. The designated evaluator could be an ethics advisory board of the type advocated at
one time by Senator Mark Hatfield (R-Or.). During the 103rd Congress, Senator Hatfield
introduced legislation to create a National Ethics Advisory Board that would report to the
Administration and Congress and would consider such issues as whether transgenic animals
or human genetic information should be patentable subject matter. Hatfield, supra note 102,
at 8-9; see also Walker, supra note 42, at 1026 ('Specialized commissions such as the National
Bioethics Advisory Commission ... are better suited to deal with the moral and ethical
problems presented by experimentation with transgenic animals and human gene sequences.
The role of the PTO has been, and should remain, to decide novelty and not morality.").
342. 35 U.S.C. § 181 (2000).
343. 35 U.S.C. § 184 (2000).
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invention. The designated evaluator could be a body within or out-
side of the USPTO, created for this specific purpose, or an existing
administrative body such as the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences.
Further, in addition to any of these options, or in combination
therewith, Congress could allow public input into the patent-
eligibility determination by adopting a post grant patent opposition
system such as exists under the EPC. Such a system would likely
apply to all issued patents but would create a USPTO proceeding in
which public opposition to morally controversial patents could be
registered.'" These possibilities are illustrative of the myriad
options open to Congress in addressing the "patent first" problem,
any of which should be preferable to the current approach.
Regardless of whether legislation providing patent eligibility
standards is specific, general, or intermediate in nature, the USPTO
and the courts will encounter difficulties applying it in practice."
The expectation of such difficulties, however, should in no way deter
Congress from setting necessary standards. The USPTO and courts
are required to apply difficult tests all the time, the nonobviousness
test of 35 U.S.C. § 103 being a prime example.' As explained by the
Supreme Court in Graham v. Deere:
344. Several commentators have advocated the introduction of a postgrant opposition
system into U.S. patent law. See, e.g., Arti K Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-
Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLuM. L. REV. 1035, 1077 (2003);
JONATHAN LEVIN & RICHARD LEVIN, PATENT OPPOSITIONS 4 (unpublished manuscript, John
M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 245, SIEPR Discussion Paper No.
01-29, 2002), available at http-/papers.ssrn.com/paper.ta? abstract- id=351900 (on file with
author); Merges, supra note 12, at 610; Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and the
Useful Arts, 74 IND. L.J. 759, 765 (1999); Allan M. Soobert, Breaking New Grounds in
Administrative Revocation of U.S. Patents: Proposition for Opposition--and Beyond, 14 SANTA
CLARA COMPurER & IGH TECH. L.J. 63, 128-44 (1998).
345. See Ho, supra note 86, at 285 (suggesting that "any temptation to incorporate morality
into the U.S. patent laws should be tempered with the reality that a change to the patent laws
may just create new issues to address, rather than addressing the issues that currently
exist").
346. See Jerzy Koopman, The Patentability of Transgenic Animals in the United States of
America and the European Union: A Proposal for Harmonization, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 103, 196 (2002) ("Obviously a moral test is hard to apply, but so is the test
of nonobviousness, or, in general contract law, the tests of equity or reasonableness and
fairness.").
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This is not to say, however, that there will not be difficulties in
applying the nonobviousness test. What is obvious is not a
question upon which there is likely to be uniformity of thought
in every given factual context. The difficulties, however, are
comparable to those encountered daily by the courts in such
frames of reference as negligence and scienter, and should be
amenable to a case-by-case development.3' 7
Ultimately, any new statute designed to place limits on patent
eligibility will provide an incomplete solution to concerns in society
about the morality of certain inventions and will fail to meet
expectations for at least some segment of the public.3 For some
people, the legislation will go too far, for others, not far enough.
Morally controversial patents will still issue from the USPTO and
unpatented but morally controversial research will still be con-
ducted unless banned pursuant to statutes or regulations outside of
the patent system. Agencies such as the FDA, USDA, and FTC will
continue to be the regulators of the use of technology in society, and
other solutions will need to be developed to address moral and
ethical concerns as both technology and societal mores evolve. The
patent system cannot regulate morality, in whole or in part, but it
need not provide incentives for research that tends to marginalize
or commoditize humanity. 9
CONCLUSION
Why does the issuance of certain patents invoke moral contro-
versy? Why should anyone care whether human embryos, or fetuses,
or clones or human-animal chimera are patentable? We should care
because patents are government-based, monopoly-like grants,
designed to encourage the investment in and exploitation of patent-
eligible subject matter.
347. 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966).
348. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 196 (discussing difficulties associated with assessing
morality in the patent context and public misconceptions of patent morality criteria under the
EPC); Ho, supra note 86, at 285 (describing patents as "at best a blunt tool to regulate
controversial matter" and calling the focus on patents "an incomplete one").
349. See Walker, supra note 148, at 110 (advocating patents on genetically modified
encephalic fetuses for the generation of body parts).
20031 545
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
The U.S. patent system is unashamedly utilitarian, with patents
providing a specific bargain between the patent owner and the
government for the ultimate promotion of the public good.' Patent
owners have the right not only to exclude others from their in-
vention, but also to alienate their property right, by sale, license,
bequest, or otherwise. Thus, we should care about patents on, for
example, human "matter" for therapeutic cloning, reproductive
cloning, organ donation, or other purposes, if we as a society are
uncomfortable with the concept of humans as personal property,
commodities that can be bought or sold for commercial or even
humanitarian benefit.
That tissue from embryos and fetuses may be useful in halting or
curing horrific diseases does not negate the human potential of such
entities and, as noted earlier, the denial of patent protection for
such subject matter will not prevent some scientists from continuing
morally controversial biotech research. Importantly, however,
ownership rights in the fruits of any such research, and the
incentives generated by anticipation of those rights, would not have
been provided by the U.S government via a patent grant.
Because the patenting of morally controversial biotech research
involves such serious, deeply felt issues, the patenting decision must
not be left, as it currently is, to scientists pushing the frontiers of
technology, motivated by factors beyond public comment and
scrutiny. No one person is competent to decide and resolve these
moral issues and determine what the limits should be. Difficult
though the task may be, Congress, through legislation, is the only
actor competent to clarify the limits of patentable subject matter
and the extent to which moral issues should be considered in
patentability determinations, if at all. Such legislation, as with
all legislation, will require interpretation by the courts. Judicial
interpretation of a statute, however, is far preferable to judicial
creation of a statute.
Specific legislation, detailing exceptions to patent eligibility or at
least its outer limits, would provide greater guidance to the USPTO
and courts in making patentability determinations. Such legislation,
however, might be rendered obsolete over time by unanticipated
advances in technology. More general legislation may retain
350. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223-24 (2003) (describing patent quid pro quo).
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temporal relevancy with changes in societal mores and advances in
technology, and will grant courts considerable leeway in creating, or
eliminating, limits driven by moral considerations. An intermediate
regime, whereby Congress, or its delegate, retains the ability to
assess patent eligibility issues on an ad hoc, pre-issuance basis may
be a preferable approach. Although no one solution is ideal, each is
consistent with our stated system of government "of the people, by
the people, for the people,"3 1 as opposed to our current "real" patent
system of government of the people, by the researchers, for their
chosen beneficiaries, be they investors and/or suffering humanity.
Until Congress comes to terms with the fact that patents as well
as bans are important, it will continue to provide contradictory
policy signals with detrimental results to society at large. Without
congressional action, the United States will continue to patent
first, and ask questions later. However, "later" may, from a moral
perspective, one day be too late.
351. Abraham Lincoln, Address at Gettysburg (Nov. 19, 1863), in THE WRrIINGS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 20, 23 (Arthur Brooks Lapsley ed., 1923).
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